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INTRODUCTION

F

orty years ago, modern Spain was born. On December 29, 1978,
the Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain came into force,
following ratification by the people of Spain earlier that month and
sanction by King Juan Carlos on the prior day. Its publication in the
Boletín Oficial del Estado, the official state gazette, was the final step
in the constitutional process that had included nearly two years of
drafting, debate, and passage by the Congress of Deputies and Senate
in their role as the Spanish constituent assembly. Most notably, the
coming into force of the Constitution marked the end of Spain’s
transition from the decades-long authoritarian dictatorship of Francisco
Franco to constitutional democracy. As the last Western European
country to adopt constitutional democracy, the Spanish transition
brought a long delayed conclusion to the era of fascism that had rent
Europe asunder since Spain (with Italy and Germany) fell to
totalitarianism in the early twentieth-century.1
Since that time, the particular process by which Spain accomplished
its democratic transition has attracted considerable attention from other
nascent democracies. Spain’s relatively peaceful transformation from
Franco-era dictatorship to modern constitutional democracy can
provide a notable and appealing model for other countries’ democratic
transitions. Spain achieved a “lawful revolution” without a sharp
disruption to existing state institutions, despite a dramatic
reformulation of its governing processes and significantly reformed
national values. The transition’s decision-making was typified by
“moderation” with a stabilizing “commitment to democratic rules,”2
and the results were accomplished through interparty consensus and
intraparty discipline.3 This type of transition is known as the Spanish
Model.4 It is a model of constitutional transition that has been
examined—and to varying degrees, adopted—by countries in later
1 For a very helpful English-language overview of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, see
VICTOR FERRERES COMELLA, THE CONSTITUTION OF SPAIN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS
(2013).
2 GREGORIO ALONSO & DIEGO MURO, Introduction to THE POLITICS AND MEMORY OF
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: THE SPANISH MODEL 1, (Gregorio Alonso & Diego Muro eds.,
Routledge, 2011).
3 See generally Bonnie Field, Interparty Consensus and Intraparty Discipline in Spain’s
Transition to Democracy, THE POLITICS AND MEMORY OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: THE
SPANISH MODEL 71, (Gregorio Alonso & Diego Muro eds., Routledge, 2011).
4 Joseph M. Colomer, Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way, 85 AMER.
POL. SCI. REV. 1283, 1283 (1991).
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transitions. Indeed, its significance is seen in the influence the Spanish
Model had on countries as varied as Poland, South Africa, and
Ethiopia.5
Today, Spain is a nation of forty-seven million people and is the
world’s thirteenth-largest economy.6 Spain’s relatively recent return to
democracy and, as a consequence, its membership in the European
Union, the Council of Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), are of significant contemporary geopolitical
importance. And, its historic lesson that dictatorship is possible even in
relatively modern and developed Western nations remains a
necessary—if frightening—reminder in our era of rightward-leaning
Western governments.
Nevertheless, Spain’s constitutional transition is less well known to
most English-language scholars than it deserves. It is overshadowed in
American scholarship by the historically contemporaneous French
Revolution, undertheorized relative to the dual waves of national
constitutionalism following the end of World War II and the Cold War,
and undervalued due to the United States’ and British Commonwealth
countries’ far closer connection to English common law and the British
constitutional tradition.
But, there is much fruitfully to study in Spanish constitutional
history and in the nation’s transition to democracy. First, the Spanish
legal legacy lives on throughout North and South America, even in the
laws of the United States. North Americans often seem to forget that
the Spanish Empire was the Americas’ largest colonial power. In
addition to the obvious cultural, religious, and linguistic influences
throughout Central and South America, Spanish territorial claims
stretched from southern Alaska, across western Canada, and at their
peak, claimed all the future United States west of the Mississippi River,
in addition to Florida and much of the Caribbean.7 The legacy of
5 See Luis López Guerra, The Application of the Spanish Model in the Constitutional
Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1937, 1942 (1998); see
also Charles E. Ehrlich, Ethnicity and Constitutional Reform: The Case of Ethiopia, 6 ILSA
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 51, 57 (1999).
6 Instituto Nacional de Estadística [Spanish National Statistics Database] reports a
January 1, 2018, population of 46.7 million persons, available at http://www.ine.es/dyngs/
INEbase/en/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736176951&menu=ultiDatos&idp
=1254735572981 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018); Spain’s 2017 Gross Domestic Product was
$1,310 billion (in USD) according to the International Monetary Fund DataMapper,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/
WEOWORLD/ESP (World Economic Outlook; Apr. 2018).
7 See generally DAVID WEBER, THE SPANISH FRONTIER IN NORTH AMERICA (Yale
1994).
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Spanish property law, water law, and family law is still evident in the
laws of many states and provinces, especially in the western United
States and the Caribbean.8 Additionally, the modern Spanish
Constitution shares the same historical antecedent as many of the
countries in the Americas: the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz.9 And finally,
because of Spain’s unique history of dictatorship and monarchy for
nearly all its history, the convoluted nature of its regional
interrelationships, and the relative modernity of its text, the Spanish
Constitution includes several highly unique—and uniquely
significant—characteristics, even while being solidly within the
Western tradition of democratic constitutionalism.
This Article seeks to understand and evaluate core elements of the
past promise and present reality of Spain’s transformation from
Francoist dictatorship to modern European democracy. It does this by
investigating the role of the 1978 Constitution and the distinctive
Spanish Model of relatively peaceful constitutional transformation in
facilitating the key legal elements of Spain’s transition to democracy.
Following a review of important historical developments related to
Spanish constitutionalism in Part I, this Article scrutinizes the process
by which Spain transitioned to democracy in the 1970s. Part II focuses
particularly on the dominant characteristics of the Spanish Model,
which facilitated peaceful democratic transformation. Part III critically
evaluates the use of the Spanish Model as a tool to decisively reject the
core political elements of the Franco regime—autocratic rule,
authoritarian governance, and fascism—and empower rights-based
constitutional democracy. Finally, Part IV assesses the significance of
the Spanish Model to the 1978 Constitution and the twenty-first century
Kingdom of Spain and anticipates the Model’s potential for future
global influence.

8 See, e.g., Eric B. Kunkel, The Spanish Law of Waters in the United States: From
Alfonso the Wise to the Present Day, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 341, 353–56 (2001) (discussing
the legacy of Spanish water law and property law); Michael J. Vaughn, The Policy of
Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 20–21 (1967)
(discussing Spanish origins of community property regimes in the United States); McCoy
v. United States, 247 F. 861, 867 (5th Cir. 1918) (Batts, J., concurring) (“[T]he territory
acquired from Mexico had for the groundwork of its jurisprudence the civil law as developed
in Spain and her colonies. When these lands were acquired, the mere act of acquisition did
not give to them a United States system of laws.”).
9 CONSTITUCIÓN DE CÁDIZ [Constitution of Cádiz] Mar. 19, 1812 (Spain), http://www.
cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/c1812/12159396448091522976624/index.htm.
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This Article argues that, despite recent, significant, and evolving
challenges, constitutional democracy is strong in Spain and has been
significantly aided by its constitutional text and the Spanish Model that
inaugurated it. The Article concludes that, four decades later, there is
much to study and learn from the way Spain successfully leveraged its
constitutional process to overcome its authoritarian past and solidify its
place as a stable modern democracy.
I
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTICONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
SPANISH HISTORY
The story of modern Spain as a constitutional democracy is partially
explicable as a divergent, sometimes painful attempt to maintain and
define a Spanish national identity in the centuries of waning global
influence following Spain’s Golden Age. The Siglo de Oro, Spain’s era
of global empire, vast colonial wealth, and monarchic stability in the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, was established with the
unification of Spain under the Catholic monarchs Isabella and
Ferdinand.10 During this period, long before the era of global
constitutionalism, the Kingdom of Spain grew from a few nominally
united monarchies on the Iberian Peninsula to a worldwide empire
spread across Europe, East Asia, and North and South America.11
With the end of Habsburg rule in the late seventeenth century,
Spanish global power waned significantly. Spain’s fiscal and political
health became more closely linked to France, through ties to the House
of Bourbon, then alliance with Revolutionary France, and eventually
defeat by Napoleon.12 Reaction against Napoleonic reforms13 (and
placement of Napoleon’s brother on the throne of Spain) eventually
brought about the first modern Spanish constitution.
Relative to many countries, Spain has not had a significant number
of national constitutions. Compared with its neighbor France (16
constitutions)14 or its colonial successor states in Latin America, for

HENRY KAMEN, GOLDEN AGE SPAIN 5–22 (2nd ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2005).
Id. at 23–39.
12 HENRY KAMEN, PHILIP V OF SPAIN: THE KING WHO REIGNED TWICE 1–33 (2001).
13 Edward J. Goodman, Spanish Nationalism in the Struggle Against Napoleon, 20 THE
REV. POL. 337 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1958).
14 Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REV. 1024 (1989).
10
11
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example, the Dominican Republic (32) 15 or Venezuela (26),16 Spain’s
history of only seven constitutions (and in practice, only three
functional democratic constitutions) in the last 300 years is relatively
modest.17 However, each of the three constitutions examined below
have an important role: the Constitution of Cádiz had global influence,
the liberal Constitution of 1931 prompted the Spanish Civil War, and
the modern Constitution of 1978 restored democracy to Spain.
A. The Constitution of Cádiz
Arguably Spain’s most significant historical constitution was the
Constitution of 1812, typically called the Constitution of Cádiz, or
more famously, La Pepa.18 It was formulated in a relatively traditional
process, with the elected, and ostensibly national, assembly (Cortes)
acting as a representative constituent assembly.19 Although much of the
Spanish territory was occupied by Napoleon’s forces as part of the
1807–14 Peninsular War, the Cádiz Cortes gathered representatives of
the regions of Spain (or, where necessary, deputized others to represent
occupied regions) to write a constitution in 1810.20 Although it was a
legislature in exile, the Cortes claimed national sovereign authority to
draft and promulgate their constitution. The Constitution of Cádiz was
nominally in force from 1812–14, again from 1820–23 following a
period in which King Ferdinand VII re-asserted absolute sovereignty,
and finally from 1836–37 as an interim document for a new constitution
in 1837.21
The significance of the Constitution of Cádiz is based on three
elements. First, it was a markedly liberal constitution for the era, hailed
15 José Luis Cordeiro, CONSTITUTIONS AROUND THE WORLD: A VIEW FROM LATIN
AMERICA 164 IDE Discussion Paper (Inst. of Dev. Econ. July 1, 2008),
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/164.html.
16 Id.
17 Aniversario Constitución Española [Spanish Constitutional Anniversary] 1978–2003:
Otras Constituciónes [Other Constitutions], EUROPA PRESS (2007), https://web.archive.org/
web/20071012233918/http://www.constitucion.es/otras_constituciones/espana/index.html.
18 CESAR ARROYO LANDA, ROLE OF CONSTITUTION OF CÁDIZ IN THE GESTATION OF
THE INDEPENDENCE OF PERU 330 (2012).
19 Roger D. Congleton, Early Spanish Liberalism and Constitutional Political Economy:
The Cádiz Constitution of 1812, CTR. FOR THE STUD. OF PUB. CHOICE 14–15 (2010),
http://www.rdc1.org/forthcoming/Early_Spanish_Political_Economy_4.pdf.
20 J.H. ELLIOTT, EMPIRES OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD: BRITAIN AND SPAIN IN AMERICA,
1492–1830, 378 (Yale 2006).
21 MATTHEW C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: THE CONSTITUTION OF
CÁDIZ AND ITS LEGACY IN SPANISH AMERICA 41 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2015).
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in the United States as “the most liberal, wise and durable . . . and even
far superior to the boasted ones of many republican governments.”22
Although it recognized the rule of King Ferdinand VII, it also gave
significant authority to the Cortes Generales as a national legislature
and included select freedoms and protections, that were broadly
available to free male residents of Spain’s American and Asian
colonies as well.23 Indeed, the constituent body gathered in Cádiz
included representatives of Spanish America as well as Spain itself.24
The Constitution included land reform and private property rights,
freedom of the press, and representational legislation under the
monarch.25
Second, because of its timing, the Constitution of Cádiz had
significant and direct impact upon the constitutions of the emerging,
postcolonial nations of South America.26 The Constitution of Cádiz has
been called “America’s other First Constitution” for its substantial and
enduring influence over the later constitutions of the Americas.27
Indeed, while in force it was the constitution of the Spanish Empire,
including her colonies in America and Asia.28 The constitutions of
Mexico, Peru, Cuba, and Ecuador still reflect this earliest source of
constitutional principles.29 The Constitution of Cádiz functioned as a
direct influence on later constitutions across Europe as well.30

22 Scott Eastman & Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, THE RISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC WORLD: THE IMPACT OF THE CÁDIZ
CONSTITUTION OF 1812 2 (2015).
23 CONSTITUCIÓN DE CÁDIZ [Constitution of Cádiz] Mar. 19, 1812 (Spain),
http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/c1812/12159396448091522976624/in
dex.htm; Lorenzo Peña, Un puente jurídico entre Iberoamérica y Europa: La Constitución
Española de 1812, in AMÉRICA Y EUROPA: IDENTIDADES, EXILIOS Y EXPECTATIVAS 95–
114 (J.M. González, ed., Madrid: Casa de América 2002).
24 MIROW, supra note 21, at 7; see generally Marie Laure Rieu-Millan, Los diputados
Americanos en las Cortes de Cádiz: Igualdad o Independencia (Madrid: Consejo Superior
de Investigaciones Científicas 1990).
25 CONSTITUCIÓN DE CÁDIZ [Constitution of Cádiz] Mar. 19, 1812 (Spain),
http://cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/c1812/12159396448091522976624/index.
htm.
26 Scott Eastman & Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, eds., THE RISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC WORLD: THE IMPACT OF THE CÁDIZ
CONSTITUTION OF 1812 41–57 (Alabama 2015); see generally MIROW, supra note 21.
27 See generally MIROW, supra note 21, at 31–73.
28 CONSTITUCIÓN DE CÁDIZ [Constitution of Cádiz] Mar. 19, 1812 (Spain), tit. 1, ch. 2,
art. 10, http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/c1812/12159396448091522
976624/index.htm.
29 MIROW, supra note 21, at 201–269.
30 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 2.
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Third, the Constitution of Cádiz represented the authoritative model
of constitutional monarchy in Spanish history. Indeed, it structured a
model of constitutionally and democratically limited monarchical
authority that would, erratically and often painfully, animate significant
controversies throughout Spanish history.
B. The Constitution of 1931
Another particularly noteworthy and influential historical
constitution31 was the Constitution of 1931. Although fated to a
relatively short life, it was a notable liberal and progressive
accomplishment. This Second Republic Constitution was a reformist
document meant to modernize Spain and align it more closely with
other European nations.32 As such, it included no role for the monarchy,
increased regional autonomy, provided expansive powers for
nationalization of industries, and included equality guarantees,
individual liberties, rights protections, and universal male suffrage33—
and in 1933, the exercise of universal female suffrage as well.34
The potential economic changes were significant for Spain, “the
Western European nation closest to feudalism” at the time.35 Economic
inequality was acute in early twentieth-century Spain, an agrarian
country where sixty-five percent of the land was held by an extremely
wealthy two percent of the population.36 Initially, the transition was a
welcome sign for liberal democracy in contrast to the rise of fascism
elsewhere on the continent. It was a hopeful sign for a peaceful return
to constitutional democracy and lawfulness after decades of political
violence and weakened rule of law in Spain.37

31 After Constitution of Cádiz, Spain had four additional constitutions prior to the
Second Republic’s Constitution of 1931. These Constitutions, each presenting models of
constitutional monarchy, were enacted in 1837, 1845, 1869, and 1876. Spain produced
written but unenacted constitutions in 1856 and 1873. See Otras Constituciónes, supra note
17.
32 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 3–5.
33 CONSTITUTIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA ESPAÑOLA [CONSTITUTION OF THE SPANISH
REPUBLIC] Dec. 9, 1931, tit. III, Derechos y Deberes de los Españoles [Rights and Duties
of the Spanish People] (Spain).
34 JUAN CARLOS OCANA AYBAR, THE 2ND REPUBLIC AND THE CIVIL WAR (1931–1936)
(IES Parque de Lisboa), http://www.historiasiglo20.org/4ESO/Spain%20-Second%20
Republic%20and%20SCW.pdf.
35 ADAM HOCHSCHILD, SPAIN IN THEIR HEARTS 23 (2016).
36 Id. at 24.
37 Id. at 23.
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The Constitution of 1931 also restructured the relationship between
Spain and the Roman Catholic Church in starkly secularist terms,
declaring that Spain’s Second Republic had “no official state
religion.”38 It disentangled the Church from certain state institutions,
providing for civil marriage, divorce, and secular education.39 The
Constitution banned religious displays, traditional Catholic education,
and even the Jesuits from Spain.40
In the end, the era of progressive constitutional democracy was
disappointing; this secular and liberal democratic period was confused,
occasionally lawless, and short-lived.41 Traditionalists asserted that the
Constitution of 1931 was socially destructive because of its progressive
elements and its radical departure from existing Spanish social and
political norms. Many described Franco’s Nationalist cause as a
rebellion to the social upheaval caused by the liberalizing and
progressive elements of the 1931 Constitution.42 Although the legacy
of the Constitution of 1931 is evident in the text of the current Spanish
Constitution, its most significant impact is the impetus it provided for
the Spanish Civil War.43
C. Anticonstitutionalism: The Civil War and Francoist Spain
The Spanish Civil War lasted nearly three horrific years beginning
in July 1936. It ended with the surrender of the last Republican forces,
those supportive of the Second Republic as established by the
Constitution of 1931, in April 1939.44 The leader of the Nationalist
forces, General Francisco Franco, ruled Spain from then until his death
in 1975.45 The Nationalists abolished the Constitution of 1931 and, as
a consequence, Spain held no democratic elections between 1936 and
1977.46
38 CONSTITUTIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA ESPAÑOLA [Constitution of the Spanish Republic]
Dec. 9, 1931, prel. tit., art. 3 (Spain).
39 Jose Antonio Souto Paz, Perspectives on Religious Freedom in Spain, 2001 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 669, 680–85 (2001).
40 Id.
41 HOCHSCHILD, supra note 35, at 23.
42 PAUL PRESTON, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR: REACTION, REVOLUTION, AND REVENGE
87–88 (WW. Norton & Co. 2006).
43 Id.
44 ANTHONY BEEVOR, THE WAR FOR SPAIN: THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 1935–39
(Penguin 2006).
45 See generally PAUL PRESTON, FRANCO (1995); STANLEY G. PAYNE & JESÚS
PALACIOS, FRANCO: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (2014).
46 Stanley Meisler, Spain’s New Democracy, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 (Oct. 1977).
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At the time of the Spanish Civil War, Americans were passionately
interested in Spain and the outcome of the war. The Civil War was the
single most reported-upon topic in The New York Times during the war
years.47 As Adam Hochschild notes in his much-lauded history of the
2,800 American civilians who fought in the Spanish Civil War,
published reports on the Spanish conflict outnumbered “any other
single topic, including President Roosevelt, the rise of Nazi Germany,
or the calamitous toll of the Great Depression.”48
The stakes certainly seemed high for an ostensibly internal struggle.
In part, this is because the responses of foreign nations seem so
predictive of the early responses to World War II: lawless Nazi
aggression, heedlessness among Spain’s democratic neighbors, and
American isolation. It is difficult to imagine the eventual success of
Franco’s Nationalist forces without the support of Hitler’s Germany
and Mussolini’s Italy. Despite the pretense of a multilateral NonIntervention Agreement, the Axis powers provided troops (in the form
of thinly-veiled “volunteers”), fuel, weapons, and international
propaganda support.49
Obviously, the Civil War itself is outside the scope of this Article;
however, there are a few characteristics of the struggle and its
consequences that affect Spanish constitutional history. The most
obvious point is that a victory by the Republicans would have left the
starkly democratic, secular, and progressive Constitution of 1931 in
force. Instead, it governed Spain for only a few years and then
languished during the Civil War, only in effect in the areas
unconquered by Franco’s Nationalists.50 Some elements of the
progressive 1931 Constitution would return, but not for nearly fifty
years.
Moreover, following Franco’s victory in the Spanish Civil War,
political dominance at the national level was complemented by active
political oppression at the regional level. Franco suppressed any
independent ethno-cultural identity for the historic regions of Spain,
with repression felt most acutely in the historically defined and
independence minded regions like the Basque Country and Catalonia.51
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 35, at xvi.
Id.
49 BEEVOR, supra note 44, at ch. 13.
50 Of course, Franco’s Nationalists created and enforced a wholly different constitutional
system in the territories they controlled. PRESTON, supra note 42, at 316–17.
51 Id.
47
48
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Francoist policies suppressed local language, traditions, and culture,
even the limited regional autonomy of the 1931 Constitution was
rejected.52 This policy, of course, exacerbated long-standing conflicts
between the national government and the regions—the consequences
of which are still dramatically evident today.53
Empowerment, rather than repression, typified the relationship
between the Franco regime and Spain’s more conservative institutions,
such as the Roman Catholic Church, the military, and the monarchy.
All three institutions benefited significantly from Franco’s victory, not
only because they had held diminished power under the Constitution of
1931 but because they enjoyed the state’s favor throughout the Franco
era.54 The relationship was certainly not one-sided; the military had
predominately sided with Franco to overthrow the Republic. The
Roman Catholic Church and Franco were closely allied throughout the
Civil War and the early years of Franco’s rule: “The ‘triumphant’
church born in the Civil War was made possible by the Franco regime,
but one could also say that the regime in large part was made possible,
stable, and long lasting thanks to the religious legitimation.”55 Franco’s
Spain was a “political monolith . . . supported by two pillars”: the
military and the church.56 Both institutions supported Franco as a
lifeline to pre-1931 influence. However, the closeness of these
relationships would affect the role of both institutions in the
constitutional framework that followed Franco’s death.
The Republican Constitution of 1931 terminated the formal power
of the monarchy, just as it had with the church.57 This is why the
monarchists joined Franco’s military coup. Their reward was the
eventual return of the monarchy when Franco declared that Juan
Carlos, grandson of the last ruling Spanish king Alfonso XIII, would
be his heir as head of state. Franco made this possible with passage of

BEEVOR, supra note 44, at 340–42, 407–09.
See, e.g., Michael Birnbaum, For Some, Catalonia Crackdown Evokes Memories of
the Dark Days of Spain’s Dictatorship, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/europe/spanish-crackdown-on-catalonia-independence-effortprompts-bitter-memories-of-franco-ictatorship/2017/11/08/b0ae6eac-bf14-11e7-9294705f80164f6e_story.html?utm_term=.1ef9f90abf0e.
54 Paz, supra note 39, at 685–87.
55 Juan J. Linz, Church and State in Spain from the Civil War to the Return of
Democracy, 120 DEADALUS 159, 163 (1991).
56 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 11.
57 Id.
52
53
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a ley fundamental in 194758 and a 1969 declaration that Juan Carlos
would be the future king of Spain—although Franco remained head of
state for life.59 The supportive role of Juan Carlos I in the transition to
democracy removed the taint of association with Franco and secured a
role for the monarchy, albeit a diminished one, in the post-Franco
constitutional scheme.
With Franco’s victory in the Civil War, Spain entered a long period
without a constitution.60 The Spain of Franco’s four decades possessed
no unitary governing document crafted through constituent power. The
modest exception to this was the Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom
(Las Leyes Fundamentales del Reino), seven quasi-constitutional laws
that declared parameters for the running of Francoist Spain.61 After
1945, there was the possibility of passage of fundamental laws with
theoretically higher-order legal force if Franco approved.62 The third of
these laws, the national referendum law (Ley del Referéndum
Nacional), allowed minimal head-of-household voting for such laws of
quasi-constitutional significance, but this power was exercised only
twice: to allow future restoration of the monarchy in 194763 and to
reorganize government power in 1967.64
The Fuero de los Españoles, another ley fundamental, ostensibly
identified the rights of Spaniards. But these “rights” were functionally
unenforceable in the courts of the regime-dependent judiciary.65 The
primary purpose of the Fuero de los Españoles was “window dressing
originally intended to hoodwink the victorious [A]llies into a belief that
58 LEY DE SUCESIÓN EN LA JEFATURA DEL ESTADO [Law of Succession of Head of
State], (July 6, 1947), http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1947/160/A03272-03273.pdf.
59 Walther Bernecker, Monarchy and Democracy: The Political Role of King Juan
Carlos in the Spanish Transición, 33 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 65 (1998).
60 See generally The Franco Years, in SPAIN: A COUNTRY STUDY (Eric Solsten &
Sandra W. Meditz, 1988), http://countrystudies.us/spain/22.htm.
61 See id. at ch. 1.
62 LEY DEL REFERENDUM NACIONAL [Law of National Referendum], (Oct. 24, 1945),
http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1945/297/A02522-02522.pdf.
63 LEY DE SUCESIÓN EN LA JEFETURA DEL ESTADO [Law on the Succession of the Head
of State], (1947), http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1947/160/A03272-03273.pdf. In the
July 6 referendum, support was claimed to be 95.1 percent of voters. See D. NOHLEN & P.
STÖVER, ELECTIONS IN EUROPE: A DATA HANDBOOK 1823 (2010).
64 LEY ORGÁNICA DEL ESTADO [Organic Law of State], (Jan. 10, 1967),
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1967/01/11/pdfs/A00466-00477.pdf.
65 José J. Toharia, Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of
Contemporary Spain, 9 LAW & SOC. REV. 475, 486–96 (1975); Carl Pinkele, Plus ca
Change: The Interaction Between the Legal System and Political Change in Francoist
Spain, 13 INT’L. POL. SCI. REV. 285 (1992).
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Spain was a liberal state.”66 Similarly, the right to vote was of little
practical import because of the starkly circumscribed power of the
legislature. Families and groups, rather than individuals, were given the
very limited right to vote and the government was in no way regulated
by the determinations of the Cortes.67 The necessary rights to free
speech, free press, and political association were unknown.68
Unsurprisingly, the regime lacked an independent judiciary during this
era as well. In the Franco era, courts had restricted authority and
minimal independence.69
The nature of authoritarian governance is the substitution of the
wishes of a single ruler for actual rule of law. In a 1962 report, the
International Commission of Jurists concluded that Franco’s regime
was based on “the intolerance and subjugation of all opposition which
characterize a totalitarian system.”70 Throughout this period, Franco
was “Caudillo,” a strongman holding military and political power; 71
the Spanish version of Nazi Germany’s “Führer” or Fascist Italy’s
“Duce.” This made him formally the head of state for Spain. He also
functioned as prime minister, which made him the head of Spain’s
legislature and one-party government as well.72 Franco also retained his
title of Generalissimo, supreme leader of the Spanish military.73
Finally, after the 1947 quasi referendum to appease monarchists in
Franco’s conservative coalition, Franco became regent for life for the
to-be-restored monarchy.74
Similarly, rather than having a constitution, Spain had only what one
historian called “the constitutional cosmetics of authoritarianism.”75
This makes perfect sense for an authoritarian dictatorship. If the
purpose of constitutionalism is to subject government power to
reasoned limitations in order to advance shared values and protect

66 RAYMUND CARR & JUAN PABLO FUSI, SPAIN: DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 45
(2nd ed. 1981).
67 Id. at 43.
68 Id. at 45–46.
69 Toharia, supra note 65, at 486–96.
70 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, SPAIN AND THE RULE OF LAW 82–88 (1962),
https://archive.org/stream/spainruleoflaw00inte/spainruleoflaw00inte_djvu.txt.
71 PAUL PRESTON, THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN 1–5 (1986).
72 STANLEY G. PAYNE, FASCISM IN SPAIN 1923–1977 239–42 (1999). See id.
73 LAURA DESFOR EDLES, SYMBOL AND RITUAL IN THE NEW SPAIN: THE TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY AFTER FRANCO 36 (Jeffrey C. Alexander & Steven Seidman eds., 1998).
74 PAYNE, supra note 72, at 401.
75 CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 40.
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rights under the rule of law, a constitution is antithetical to
authoritarianism.
The overarching political model of the Franco era was one of
significant but not classic authoritarianism organized along quasifascist models of citizen control. Commentators have noted that it is
difficult to precisely place Franco’s Spain in a typology of political
science. As the Francoists insisted, “Spain is different.”76 This is
unsurprising since the defining characteristics of a particular autocracy
track the individual ruler with his own quirks and perspective.
Necessarily, a long-enduring state organized around such an
idiosyncratic cult will bear the unique characteristics of that individual.
As one commentator said of Franco in the 1960s, “[H]e does not make
politics, he is politics.”77
Over the decades, Francoism evolved. The unchallenged autocratic
rule of Franco in 1940 finally had to accommodate the looming
question of the 1970s: “After Franco, what?”78 This was in part
accomplished through the pseudoconstitutional ley fundamental
process, culminating in the Organic Law of 1967.79 The final ley
fundamental was part of a strategy to address the issue of post-Franco
Spain; it attempted to institutionalize the characteristics of the Francoist
state institutions. However, this “constitution” was crafted without
democratic legitimacy and existed in the absence of the rule of law; it
could claim little legitimacy and placed no real limits on the actions of
Franco’s government.
D. Transitioning to the Transformation
Franco’s poor succession choices and the democratic commitments
of Franco’s legally identified heir allowed Spain to transition to
democracy. According to an earlier determination, Juan Carlos I
assumed the throne as King of Spain upon the death of Franco on
November 22, 1975, and became head of state.80 Franco had chosen

Id. at 49.
Id. at 1.
78 Id. at 40–41.
79 LEY ORGÁNICA DEL ESTADO [Organic Law of State], (Jan. 10, 1967),
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1967/01/11/pdfs/A00466-00477.pdf.
80 MICHAEL T. NEWTON WITH PETER J. DONAGHY, INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN SPAIN:
A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GUIDE 31 (1997).
76
77
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Juan Carlos over his potentially more liberal father to ensure the
maintenance of a Spanish nation along the Francoist model.81
Initially, Carlos Arias Navarro, and then, within months, Adolfo
Suárez held the position of prime minister for the still undemocratic
Cortes under the authority of the King.82 Both were recognized as
committed supporters of Franco. However, where the exceedingly
modest democratic reforms of Arias Navarro had failed, the more
robust changes of Suárez were successful. They allowed for Spain’s
democratic elections in 1976, the first since 1931, and altered the
political and legal framework to allow for such democratic
developments.83
The election, although weighted in favor of the more conservative
views, allowed participation by all political parties. This fulfilled a
promise the King had made when he addressed the U.S. Congress in
June 1976, where he promised to “ensure, under the principles of
democracy . . . the orderly access to power of distinct political
alternatives, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the
people.”84 The consequence of the election was a broadly
representative Cortes poised to reshape the Spanish political landscape
through a constitution that sharply rejected the political forms and
values of the Franco era.
The promised elections were held in 1977. A contemporary reporter
described the scenes that Franco would have abhorred:
Communists brazenly waving red banners, chanting slogans, and
singing the Internationale; the young, dynamic leader of the Socialist
Workers Party entering rallies with his left hand in a clenched fist
salute, his right signaling V for victoria; politicians exhorting
Basques in Euskera, Catalans in Catalan, Galicians in Gallego, all
forbidden languages a few years before; and newspapers belittling
their government and its leader.85

EDLES, supra note 73, at 37.
Id.
83 See LEY 1/1977, DE 4 DE ENERO, PARA LA REFORMA POLITICA [Law of Political
Reform], (Jan. 5, 1977), http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1977/01/05/pdfs/A00170-00171.pdf.
84 Meisler, supra note 46, at 56; see generally A King for Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, June
4, 1976, at A24.
85 Meisler, supra note 46.
81
82
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II
A MODERN SPANISH CONSTITUTION IN THE EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL
Spaniards commonly refer to the period between Franco’s death and
the inauguration of the new Constitution as La Transición.86 But, from
most perspectives, Spain’s second twentieth-century transition is more
accurately described as a transformation. With Franco’s death, the
nation lost its thirty-five-year commander in chief, prime minister, and
head of state. In its short transition period, the nation would also discard
its quasi-constitutional Fundamental Laws and draft and ratify a
radically new constitution. From November 1975 to December 1978,
Spain would transform from an internationally disfavored Francoist
autocracy to a modern European constitutional democracy with an eye
on membership in the Council of Europe, the European Communities,87
and NATO.88
If “transformation” describes the quality of the change, the actual
process by which the transition occurred has acquired a different
moniker among scholars: the Spanish Model.89 As discussed in more
depth below, the Spanish Model is shorthand for a relatively peaceful
constitutional transition typified by legal continuity with the prior
regime, an elites-driven process of negotiation, and broad popular
consensus that avoids extreme results. This model was eagerly studied
86 Some commentators extend this transitional period to the failed 1981 coup d’état or
to the 1982 elections that peacefully transitioned to an elected socialist government. PILAR
ORTUÑO ANAYA, LOS SOCIALISTAS EUROPEOS Y LA TRANSICIÓN ESPAÑOLA (1959–1977)
[EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS AND THE SPANISH TRANSITION (1959–1977)] 22 (Marcial Pons.
2005) (“Con respecto al final del proceso de la transición española, existen diferencias de
opinión entre los especialistas de este periodo.” [With regard to the end of the Spanish
transitional process, there are differences of opinion among specialists of this era.]).
87 Étienne Deschamps, The Accession of Spain and Portugal, CENTRE VIRTUEL DE LA
CONNAISSANCE DE L’EUROPE, http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the_accession_of_spain_and_
portugal-en-b1dd040b-7463-4e67-88f2-4890f5b8fac6.html (last updated Aug. 7, 2016). In
1977 when Spain applied, and in 1986 when Spain acceded to the treaties, it was not yet
referred to as the European Union. Spain acceded to the European Coal and Steel
Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic
Community, the E.U.’s predecessor entities with merged administration under the Treaty of
Brussels (1965). Timeline: History of the European Union, THE TELEGRAPH [UK] (Sept.
14,
2009),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/6181087/Timelinehistory-of-the-European-Union.html.
88 Francisco José Rodrigo Luelmo, The Accession of Spain to NATO, CENTRE VIRTUEL
DE LA CONNAISSANCE DE L’EUROPE, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2010/4/28/
831ba342-0a7c-4ead-b35f-80fd52b01de9/publishable_en.pdf (last updated Aug. 7, 2016).
89 ALONSO & MURO, supra note 2.
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and loosely followed by countries in later, analogous transitions. This
Part examines the mechanisms, the model, and the meaning of Spain’s
post-authoritarianism transformation.
A. Drafting a Modern Spanish Constitution
Upon the long anticipated death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco
on November 20, 1975, Spain entered an uncertain era of transition.
Franco had determined and enforced the form, tenor, and actual rulers
of the prior thirty-five years. Even in the waning years of his
dictatorship, Spain was Franco’s. Moreover, while the rest of Western
Europe90 had inaugurated a post-War process of closer economic
integration (through the European Communities), mutual defense
(through NATO), and promotion of human rights (through the Council
of Europe), Spain had been relegated to the sidelines during these
international developments.
1. Earliest Steps Toward Constitutional Democracy
As arranged by Franco prior to his death, the Cortes Generales, the
appointed Francoist pseudo-Parliament, proclaimed Juan Carlos I to be
King of Spain.91 This could have been a calamitous beginning for a
constitutional transition because Juan Carlos was the grandson of
Alfonso XIII, the king deposed by the Constitution of 1931.92
Moreover, Juan Carlos was Franco’s anointed and groomed successor,
and Juan Carlos had even stepped in as acting head of state during the
protracted illnesses near the end of Franco’s life.93 He had expressly
affirmed his commitment to the Franco regime’s laws prior to his
coronation.94
However, the priorities of the newly restored king were not those of
the prior regime. Although there was no abrupt rupture with the
Francoist state or dismantling of Francoist state institutions, Juan
Carlos I took steps to advance the transition away from
authoritarianism. As king, Juan Carlos supported democracy in
90 The notable exception is Portugal, which also transitioned from autocratic rule on a
similar, but slightly earlier, timeline. Following the Carnation Revolution, Portugal held
democratic elections in 1974 and ratified its democratic constitution in 1976. DOUGLAS L.
WHEELER & WALTER C. OPELLO JR., HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF PORTUGAL xxviii (3d
ed. 2010).
91 Bernecker, supra note 59, at 70.
92 EDLES, supra note 73, at 29.
93 See generally Bernecker, supra note 59.
94 CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 208.
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unexpected ways. Importantly, he appointed Adolfo Suárez, a
Francoist insider who soon revealed his commitment to reform, as
prime minister.95 Working within the existing Francoist institutions, the
appointed prime minister proposed substantial political and democratic
reforms. Suárez would go on to become the first democratically elected
Prime Minister of Spain in the 1977 elections—the first genuine
election since 1931.96
The transition to parliamentary democracy preceded the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain. The Law of
Political Reform (Ley para la Reforma Politica), proposed in 1976,
signaled the commitment to a peaceful transition without a radical
rupture of the existing legal framework.97 Passed by the undemocratic
Cortes and overwhelmingly affirmed in a popular referendum,98 the
law paved the way for the return and promotion of political and social
groups persecuted by Franco.99 The resulting elections gave a plurality
to the United Democratic Centre Party (Unión de Centro Democrático)
of Suárez (with 34.3 percent of the vote) but also showed significant
political support for the center-left Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español), which received 28.5 percent of
the vote.100 But the election was only the first step in a long process of
transformation for Spain. The newly elected and newly representative
Cortes was “a democratic institution in the middle of a sea of dictatorial
power structures.”101 A new constitution would be necessary to
transform Spain.
2. Constitutional Drafting Process
It was in this period of optimism, following the first democratic
elections since the Civil War, that the constitutional drafting process
95 Suárez was briefly preceded by Arias Navarro, the King’s initial appointment as prime
minister. EDLES, supra note 73, at 37.
96 Charles Powell, Revisiting Spain’s Transition to Democracy, IEMED 39, 46–47
(2016).
97 See generally LEY 1/1977, DE 4 DE ENERO, PARA LA REFORMA POLITICA [Law of
Political Reform], (Jan. 5, 1977), http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1977/01/05/pdfs/A0017000171.pdf.
98 Congress of the Deputies, Referéndum sobre el Proyecto de Ley para la Reforma
Política [Referendum on the Project of the Law for Political Reform] (voting results), at
http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/referendos/ref_r_p.htm; EDLES, supra note 73, at
11.
99 CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 218.
100 PRESTON, supra note 71, at 119.
101 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 12.
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began in earnest.102 Although Spaniards had overwhelmingly supported
more centrist political parties in the 1977 elections,103 tensions
remained. Suárez navigated tense relations with a military accustomed
to significant governmental influence, elements of the independence
minded Basque region that employed terrorist violence, and
emboldened opposition political parties.104 In an era of increased
unemployment and economic stagnation, the possibility of further
violence, unrecoverable political fracture, or the collapse of popular
support for reforms was significant.105
Hence, the initial optimism, the savvy—if occasionally
unprincipled—leadership by Suárez, and the general mood of
consensus for nation building allowed the drafting of the constitution
to begin.106 De facto cooperation and the dominant spirit of consensus
among the centrist political parties facilitated the process of
constitutional drafting. Moreover, and vitally, the 1977 Moncloa Pact,
a temporary truce regarding economic policies agreed on by political
parties on the left and the right, minimized the threat of political
disruption arising from economic protests—at least for the period of
the constitutional transition.107
The elected deputies of the Cortes formed a Committee for
Constitutional Affairs and Public Liberties to draft the new
constitution. The Committee consisted of thirty-six Parliament
members in proportion to their party’s representation in Congreso, the
larger house of the Cortes.108 The primary driver of success, however,
was achieved through the appointment of a seven-member drafting
subcommittee of high-level representatives of the primary political
parties.
Surprisingly, “the seven carried out their labours in a spirit of
compromise and cooperation.”109 They had such success that they
offered a first constitutional draft after just three months, in November
1977. This success in finding agreeable compromises contributed to the

PRESTON, supra note 71, at 122–23.
EDLES, supra note 73, at 65–67.
104 See PRESTON, supra note 71, at ch. 5.
105 Thomas D. Lancaster, Economics, Democracy, and Spanish Elections, in ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS AND ELECTORAL OUTCOMES: THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE
110, 117 (Heinz Eulau & Michael S. Lewis-Beck eds., 1985).
106 See PRESTON, supra note 71, at ch. 5.
107 Lancaster, supra note 105, at 117.
108 NEWTON, supra note 80, at 15.
109 See PRESTON, supra note 71, at ch. 5.
102
103

2018] Forty Years from Fascism: Democratic Constitutionalism
and the Spanish Model of National Transformation

21

sub-committee’s nickname as the “Consensus Committee.”110 The
ultimate success of the authors resulted in their more enduring
nickname: “los padres de la Constitution.”111
A more developed first draft was reviewed by the Cortes in January
1978, considered by constitutional committees of both houses
(Congreso and Senado), and then returned to the seven-member
subcommittee of the Constitutional Affairs Committee so it could
consider more than 1300 possible amendments to the draft.112 The next
round of the drafting process evidenced sharper differences with
tensions on a variety of topics, including education, the role of the
Roman Catholic Church, and regional autonomy. Despite difficulties,
the seven drafters returned a signed second draft to the Constitutional
Affairs Committee in mid-April 1978.113 After 1342 speeches over the
course of 148 hours of debate, the Committee of Constitutional Affairs
submitted the finalized draft to the Congreso.114 After passage in the
Congreso, a slightly altered version was passed by the Senado.115 A
reconciled version of the differing drafts resulted in a final amended
proposal that was passed by an overwhelmingly positive vote of both
bodies on October 31, 1978.116 On a vote with 11 “no” votes and a
commanding 551 “yes” votes (with just 22 abstentions), the
constitutional draft was submitted to the people for ratification.117 On
December 6, 1978, in an expected but decisive victory, 87.8 percent of
the 15.8 million voters supported the constitution.118 More remarkably,
only 7.8 percent of voters nationwide opposed the constitution.119 In a
final step, the constitution came into force on December 29, 1978, one
day after it was signed by the King.120
EDLES, supra note 73, at 102.
See, e.g., FERRERES, supra note 1, at 12.
112 EDLES, supra note 73, at 102.
113 Id. at 102–04.
114 Id. at 103–04.
115 PRESTON, supra note 71, at 139.
116 The vote in Congreso: yes 326; no 6; abstain 14. The vote in the Senado: yes 226; no
5; abstain 8. NEWTON, supra note 80, at 17.
117 Id.
118 Although overall turnout was somewhat negatively affected by low turnout in the
Basque region, nearly 68 percent of Spaniards voted in the ratification plebiscite. EDLES,
supra note 73, at 104.
119 Id. at 104–05. Significant abstentions in the independence-minded regions explain
the differing numbers; 51.5 percent abstained in Galicia, 51.7 percent in the Basque region,
and 31.7 percent in Catalonia. See also PRESTON, supra note 71, at 150.
120 EDLES, supra note 73, at 104; George E. Glos, The New Spanish Constitution
Comments and Full Text, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47 (1979).
110
111
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3. Influences on the Drafting Process
The particular outcomes of the consensus process were heavily
molded by three influences: the external environment, especially the
existence of relatively mature regional and international organizations;
the timing of the constitutional process in the 1970s; and the
overarching goal of post-Franco transformation. First, the appeal of
membership in the post-War European institutions and Western
alliances shaped certain elements of the new constitution.
Second, the relatively exceptional timing of the Spanish
constitutional drafting process—in the period well after World War II
and the establishment of the post-War human right consensus but
before the end of the Cold War—influenced the content and protection
of civil and political rights as well as the inclusion of weaker provisions
related to workers and social welfare rights.
Third, popular reaction against the repressive, authoritarian, and
anti-democratic characteristics of the Franco regime inclined the
process toward significant structural and values-based changes. All
three elements encouraged rights-based, democratic constitutionalism
and significant socio-political transformation.
a. Influence from the External Geopolitical Environment
Franco’s Spain was generally excluded from the European post-War
movement towards cooperative international organizations,
consolidation of democratic and rights-based norms, and closer
economic integration. Integration with the global community was such
an important goal of the transitional and early constitutional periods
that it is impossible to fully comprehend the modern legal framework
under which the Spanish people live without some discussion of the
legal milieu within which the modern Spanish state functions: the
European Union, the Council of Europe, NATO, and the United
Nations, as well as other international bodies related to trade, political
and social integration, and human rights.
Spain’s lack of genuine democratic institutions and failure to protect
human rights precluded it from membership in the European
Communities (now the European Union) and the Council of Europe
during the Franco era.121 For the same reasons, Spain was not yet a
member of the United Nations when the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by that body, and Spain did not
become a signatory of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
121

PRESTON, supra note 71, at 60.
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Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights until after Franco’s death.122
Spain’s outsider status faded over the decades following the Spanish
Civil War and World War II because of changes in global politics and
evolution in the Franco regime’s domestic policies. Indeed, the text of
the 1978 Constitution demonstrates clear evidence of the desire for
Spain to, in the words of another nation’s transformative constitution,
“take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.”123
Spain had not been kept out of all international organizations. It was
permitted to join the United Nations in 1955.124 This occurred in spite
of suspicion toward Franco’s multiple opportunistic shifts in
alliances—more accurately, his swing in de facto support despite
assurances of neutrality—during World War II.125 Indeed, despite
formal censure from the United Nations in 1946, within a decade
Spain’s strategic importance in the burgeoning Cold War led to full
membership in the United Nations.126 In a similarly pragmatic
evolution of policy, the United States, which had excluded Spain from
the Marshall Plan in the mid-1940s, normalized relations with Franco,
expressly aligned with Spain for purposes of defense, and provided
substantial financial support a decade later.127
The Constitution allowed for, and expected, international
arrangements at the time it was written and ratified. The first article of
the Bill of Rights (Chapter One, “Fundamental Rights and Duties”)
presumes Spain’s membership in international human rights
organizations.128 Today, Spain is a signatory of a broad array of
international agreements including the UDHR (1955), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1977) and its

122 United Nations, “Status of Treaties,” TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND,
https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&
clang=_en.
123 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, Feb. 4, 1997, pmbl.
124 EDLES, supra note 73, at 32.
125 Foreign Policy Under Franco, in SPAIN: A COUNTRY STUDY (Eric Solsten & Sandra
W. Meditz, eds., 1988), http://countrystudies.us/spain/24.htm.
126 EDLES, supra note 73, at 32.
127 Solsten & Meditz, supra note 125, at ch. 24.
128 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, art. 10 (“The
principles relating to the fundamental rights and liberties recognised by the Constitution
shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
international treaties and agreements thereon ratified by Spain.”).
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individual complaints mechanism (1984),129 the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1977) and its
individual complaints protocol (2010), and many others. 130
Spain’s eagerness to join the framework of European human rights
institutions is evident in the rapidity with which it signed human rights
treaties and joined human rights bodies following Franco’s death.
Undoubtedly, this reflects a complementary interest by those bodies to
welcome Spain into their existing networks as well. Spain joined the
Council of Europe, became a signatory of the European Convention on
Human Rights,131 and became subject to the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Human Rights more than a year before its new
Constitution came into force.132 It ratified the Council of Europe’s
European Social Charter in May 1980 and every amendment and
additional protocol to the Charter.133 In fact, Spain is a signatory of
seventeen of the eighteen most prominent international human rights
treaties administered by the United Nations.134
But Spain did not join only human rights bodies. It was a clear goal
of the newly democratic Spain to become a member of the European
Community, the historical predecessor of today’s European Union.
Membership had been denied in 1962 because Spain was not a

129 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION (Jan. 7, 2018), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%
20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf.
130 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION (Jan. 2, 2017), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/
Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-3-a.en.pdf; Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION (Dec. 10, 2008), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3a&chapter=4&clang=_en.
131 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Apr. 11, 1950), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=ZIAcTejb.
132 Spain became a signatory on November 24, 1977. Member States: Spain, COUNCIL
OF EUROPE, http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/spain.
133 Spain and the European Social Charter, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016804
92969.
134 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Status of
Ratification Interactive Dashboard, “Spain,” http://indicators.ohchr.org (This interactive
web tool allows the user to search based on any of the eighteen treaties and their optional
protocols or based on country. Spain is currently not a signatory of the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families: 2003).
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democracy.135 Following its evolution into a constitutional democracy,
Spain’s challenge—similar to that of Greece and Portugal—was to
comply with certain economic markers determined by the nine existing
member states.136 Spain (along with Portugal) acceded to the European
Community treaties in 1986.137
Of course, the nature of the legal obligations and practical benefits
derived from such membership has changed over time as the legal
framework of the European Community has evolved into the European
Union. The full legal impact of E.U. membership is outside the scope
of this Article, but it does in fact extend back to the founding of the
modern Spanish democratic state. Chapter II, Section 93 anticipated
Spanish membership in the European Community (E.C.) and other
international bodies in which it was denied membership during the
Franco dictatorship:
By means of an organic law, authorisation may be granted for
concluding treaties by which powers derived from the Constitution
shall be vested in an international organisation or institution. It is
incumbent on the Cortes Generales or the Government, as the case
may be, to guarantee compliance with these treaties and with the
resolutions emanating from the international and supranational
organisations in which the powers have been vested.138

Other provisions in the Constitution seem similarly designed to equip the
state to qualify for membership in the E.C. and other bodies.139
There was far less popular or political support domestically for
Spain’s membership in NATO, which it joined in 1982.140 Spain’s
position at the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea offered NATO a
critical location for military bases and maneuvers.141 Further, it was
hoped that NATO membership (and reinforcement of links to the West)
would encourage democratic developments in newly democratic Spain.
135 Ronald Janse, The Evolution of the Political Criteria for Accession to the European
Community, 1957–1973, 24 EUR. L.J. 57, 64–70 (2018).
136 Sebastian Royo & Paul Christopher Manuel, Some Lessons from the Fifteenth
Anniversary of the Accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Union, 8 S. EURO. SOC
& POL. 1, 11–15 (2003).
137 Id. at 1.
138 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. III, ch. 2, art.
93.
139 Id. at pt. VII, art. 135, § 3. “The volume of public debt for all the Public
Administrations as a whole as a ratio of the State’s Gross Domestic Product shall not surpass
the benchmark figure set forth in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”
140 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 11.
141 Solsten & Meditz, supra note 125, at ch. 24.
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But, the United States’ long support for Franco rankled many parties
and leaders on the left, and there was doubt about the claimed benefits
for Spain.142
Spain rapidly overcame its geopolitical isolation and advanced
European integration within a few years of Franco’s death. These
developments both preceded and were further facilitated by the
Constitution’s anticipation of these international connections.
Additionally, Spain’s popular desire for and constitutional
accommodation of membership in established regional and
international organizations was influenced by both the timing of
Spain’s transition and the desire for transformation in the constitutional
process.
b. The Timing of the Transition
Many of the most notable characteristics of Spanish constitutional
law derive from the timing of the drafting of the Constitution. The
distinctiveness is evidenced in both structural and rights-oriented
textual provisions. As a consequence, three timing-related factors
significantly affected the Spanish Constitution: the capacity to study
maturing (and respected) postwar constitutions, the prominence of
international and regional human rights documents, and the relative
success of two decades of European integration. These established
elements of post-War European democracy exerted an irresistible
gravitational pull on Spain’s constitutional transition.
Spain drafted its Constitution in a relatively quiet era of
constitutional development. Although the entirety of the second-half of
the twentieth-century witnessed a significant number of new
constitutions each year, the late 1970s had nothing like the post–World
War II and postcolonialism abundance of constitution drafting.143
Equally, Spain’s transition preceded the wave of the late century
constitution drafting at the end of the Cold War.
Greece and Portugal were crafting post-dictatorship constitutions on
nearly the same timeline as Spain: Greece completed its post-junta
constitution in June 1975, and Portugal’s Carnation Revolution

142 Id. The important decision lacked the hallmark transition-era consensus when UCD
initiated a successful majority vote in the Spanish Cortes in December 1981. Seth King,
Spain Enters NATO as First Country to Join Since 1955, N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (May 31, 1982).
143 ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2009), http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/chronology/ (last
visited Oct. 31, 2018).
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resulted in a new constitution in April 1976.144 Otherwise, a major
European country had not had a new constitution since France’s de
Gaulle-motivated 1958 constitution.145 Indeed, in Western Europe
today, only Switzerland and Finland have newer constitutions than
Spain, both established in 1999.146 The drafting of a Spanish
constitution three decades after World War II meant that it was crafted
after the post-War constitutions had been established and functioned in
practice. The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland) had come into force in 1949.147 The Basic Law is
routinely viewed as one of the most influential constitutions in the
world and it is certainly the most influential modern constitution.148
Like the German Basic Law, the Spanish Constitution created a strong
constitutional court as a check on unlawful uses of state power.149 The
description of the German Constitutional Court as “a strict but
benevolent guardian of an immature democracy that cannot quite trust
itself”150 could also be true of the Spanish Constitutional Court created
nearly thirty years later. The Constitutional Courts share several
characteristics: exclusive constitutional subject matter jurisdiction
(neither is a supreme court of appeal for general legal claims like the
144 CONSTITUIÇÂO POLITICA DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION] 1976
(Port.); 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] (Greece). Surprisingly, the Portugal
Constitution seems to have had little influence upon the Spanish Constitution. This is
surprising due to their historical and geographical connections, their common twentiethcentury dictatorships, and the nearly contemporary transition to democracy. Portugal
completed its democratic constitution in 1976, during the Spanish drafting process. The
Spanish Constitution was more influenced by the German and Italian constitutions. ROBERT
L. MADDOX, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 405 (3rd ed. 2008).
145 1958 CONST. (Fr.). Cyprus (1960), Monaco (1962), and Malta (1965) also ratified
new constitutions in this era. ELKINS ET AL., supra note 143.
146 Andorra also ratified its first constitution in 1993. Timeline of Constitutions,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT,
http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.
org/chronology/.
147 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at https://www.gesetze-ominternet.de/englisch_gg/.
148 Michaela Hailbronner, Rethinking the Rise of the German Constitutional Court:
From Anti-Nazism to Value Formalism, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 626, 626–27 (2016) (
“celebrations [of the 60th anniversary of the German Constitution] captured the
contemporary consensus about the German Constitutional Court, often described as one of
the most powerful and most admired courts in the world. The Basic Law and many of the
Court’s jurisprudential innovations have become export models in many foreign countries.
For some liberal American scholars, the German Constitutional Court has even come to
define the positive counter-model to the U.S. Supreme Court.”).
149 JUSTIN COLLINGS, DEMOCRACY’S GUARDIAN: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 1951–2001 xxvi (2015).
150 Id. at xxxv.
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United States Supreme Court); both were created as capstone courts
over a mostly unreformed judiciary, i.e., there was no purge of the prior
regime’s judges;151 and both are final and supreme on constitutional
issues.
Additionally, as with many post-War constitutions, the rights and
liberty protections of Chapter I of the Spanish Constitution are heavily
influenced by the desire to advance and protect human dignity.152
Although it is impossible to decisively trace the source of rights in the
Spanish Constitution, there is significant crossover in the list of rights
in the German Basic Law and those in Chapter II of the Spanish
Constitution.
Similarities between the constitutional systems were perhaps
inevitable. Germany and Spain (as well as Italy, another influential
source for Spanish constitutionalism)153 wrote their constitutions while
transitioning out of authoritarian eras dominated by a single leader
through divisive and repressive tactics.154 The preceding totalitarian
regimes were not successfully removed by domestic political forces or
internal rebellion. Moreover, both nations transitioned to democracy
under significant international scrutiny—allied occupation and
supervision of the constitutional drafting process for Germany, and
European Community and NATO attention for Spain.
The influence of the international and regional human rights treaties
and, by 1978, international courts like the European Court of Human
Rights, was a feature specifically welcomed by the 1978 Spanish
Constitution. Article 10(2) of the Constitution states: “Principles
relating to the fundamental rights and liberties recognized by the
Constitution shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and

151 Omar G. Encarnación, Reconciliation after Democratization: Coping with the Past
in Spain, 123 POL. SCI. Q. 435, 437 (2008).
152 MAR AGUILERA VAQUÉS & ROSARIO SERRA CRISTÓBAL, RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
IN THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION 15 (2015).
153 Comparative Constitutionalism in Practice, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 543, 567 (2005);
Enrique Guillén López, Judicial Review in Spain: The Constitutional Court, 41 LOY. L.A.
L. Rev. 529, 530–32 (2008).
154 López, supra note 153, at 530. María José Martínez Jurico & Stephen G.H. Roberts,
How a Constitution is Made: An Interview with Alfonso Guerra, in 1812 ECHOES: THE
CÁDIZ CONSTITUTION IN HISPANIC HISTORY, CULTURE AND POLITICS 337, (Stephen G.H.
Roberts & Adam Sharman, eds., 2013) (“No, no, teníamos los textos. Teníamos La Pepa, la
del 31, la italiana, la alemana [No, no, we had the texts. We had La Pepa, the one from 1931,
the Italian, the German]”.).
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agreements thereon ratified by Spain.”155 Such an interpretive
provision, especially a mandatory one such as this, is an effective
transitional strategy when a transforming country acknowledges a lack
of rights enforcement experience among existing courts and judges at
the time a new constitution comes into force.
For Spain, this supported the development of a domestic rights
jurisprudence despite the absence of a new or entirely reformed
judiciary.156 This permitted significant influence from human rights
treaties, especially through the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights.157 The influence of international and regional norms is
particularly strong in Spain, where the Constitutional Court has
amplified their impact. In addition to using the Constitution’s article
10(2) command to interpret domestic constitutional rights in light of
European Court of Human Rights’ case law, the tribunal applies
European Convention rights with the force of domestic constitutional
provisions, and has required lower Spanish courts to do the same.158
For these reasons, one commentator noted of Spain, that “the capacity
of the legal system to guarantee the effectiveness of the ECHR is
virtually perfect.”159 In a further reflection of the transformational role
of such alignment with regional rights bodies, the same author declares,
“Spain is one of the great success stories of post-authoritarian, rightsbased democratization, and the ECHR is an important part of that
story.”160

155 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, art. 10, § 2. The
complementarity of the jurisprudence is supported by significant textual similarities in the
rights provisions themselves. The 1948 UDHR and the 1950 European Convention include
a list of rights that are markedly similar to the final rights provisions of the 1978
Constitution. This is an obvious result of Spain’s incorporation of the existing global and
European norms—both of which were well established and respected by the time Spain
wrote its Constitution; see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/; Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 131.
156 See Mercedes Candela Soriano, The Reception Process in Spain and Italy, in A
EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 393,
394 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
157 Pedro Julio Tenorio Sánchez, The Convergence of the Fundamental Rights
Protection in Europe, 52 IUS GENTIUM 14 (2016).
158 Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet, Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National
Legal Systems, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEMS 677, 684 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
159 Id.
160 Id.
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The final critical influence of timing on the Spanish Constitution
relates to the relative maturation of the project of European integration.
Indeed, Spain was drafting a constitution after twenty years of
institutional organization and geographic growth for the European
Community. The customs union was in place; the Treaty of Brussels
had consolidated the three Communities (European Community for
Steel and Coal, the European Economic Community, and EURATOM)
and the Community had grown to nine member states with the addition
of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973.161
Indeed, Spain’s desire (and expectation) to join the European
Community, i.e., that “powers derived from the Constitution shall be
transferred to an international organization or institution,” is evidenced
in the final text of the Constitution. Together with the rest of the
substantial references to international treaties,162 Spain’s intentions are
evident. The prospect of membership in the E.U., NATO, and the
Council of Europe acted as a support for the core elements of the 1978
Constitution: rule of law, political stability, market economy, and
authentic democracy. For Spain, timely membership in the European
Community provided support for its economic development goals and
ratified its democratic transformation.
4. Transformative Elements in the 1978 Constitution
New constitutions are often built upon rejection of their polity’s
prior constitution or a former regime’s perceived failings. This is one
significantly helpful way to view the core features of the Spanish
Constitution. Indeed, from its earliest declarations, the 1978
Constitution is a refutation of Francoism, authoritarianism, and the four
decades of Spanish government after the Civil War. Furthermore, and
helpfully, it also rejects the no-compromise, imposition-by-the-victors
model that typified the 1931 Constitution. The Preamble announces the
Constitution’s purposes to
Guarantee democratic coexistence within the Constitution and the
laws, in accordance with a fair economic and social order;
Consolidate a State of Law which ensures the rule of law as the
expression of the popular will;

161 See generally ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION chs. 8–10
(Desmond Dinan, ed., 2006).
162 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. III, ch. 3, art.
93–96.
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Protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human
rights, of their culture and traditions, languages and institutions;
Promote the progress of culture and of the economy to ensure a
dignified quality of life for all;
Establish an advanced democratic society and Cooperate in the
strengthening of peaceful relations and effective cooperation among
all the peoples of the earth.163

These declared purposes of the 1978 Constitution stand in contrast
to the Spanish legal regime and the evident state values in the Franco
era. The Preamble’s core assertions of democracy, fairness, rule of law,
rights protections, dignity, and quality of life for all Spanish persons
and peoples of Spain define the values of the modern democratic
country. This transformed state, a “social and democratic nation ruled
by law,” is starkly different from Franco’s Spain.164
This notion of reactive constitutional drafting—the idea that the
provisions of later constitutions are starkly influenced by reaction
against the perceived failures of the prior government—seems selfevident in the constitutional history of many countries. Nevertheless, it
is always difficult to attribute direct causation to the later regime’s
constitutional decisions. However, even without causal certainty, a
cursory list of disfavored characteristics of Franco’s regime is easily
contrasted with the radically different textual promises of the 1978
Constitution. This requires us to contrast the Constitution’s promises
with the autocratic rule of Franco in a fundamentally authoritarian
system of government animated by a fascistic philosophy.
The most obvious structural change provided by the 1978
Constitution is the return of meaningful, robust democracy. One of the
core elements of autocratic governments is the consolidation of power
in a single person. The restoration of adult suffrage and the division of
elected representatives into multiple, genuinely empowered state
organs is a flat rejection of autocracy. Moreover, the structural division
of state competencies between national and regional authorities further
refutes the radical unification of power typified by the earlier system.
Similarly, if we understand authoritarianism as a system of
government where “individual freedom is held as completely
subordinate to the power or authority of the state, centered . . . in one

163
164

Id. at pmbl.
Id. at prelim pt., art. 1, § 1.
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person . . . [who] is not constitutionally accountable to the people,”165
the 1978 Constitution, with its numerous supports for the rule of law,
is a stark transformation. At the highest level, the Constitution’s
express application of constitutional norms to all state entities is the
essence of the rule of law. The Constitution does this in the very first
sentence: “Spain is hereby established as a social and democratic State,
subject to the rule of law, which advocates freedom, justice, equality
and political pluralism as highest values of its legal system.”166 Other
elements in the Constitution’s preliminary title reaffirm the rule of law.
Article 9(1) declares that “[c]itizens and public authorities are bound
by the constitution and all other legal provisions,” and Section 9(3)
affirms “the principle of legality, the hierarchy of legal provisions, . . .
the certainty that the rule of law shall prevail, the accountability of
public authorities, and the prohibition of arbitrary action of public
authorities.”167
These promises of legality and the promise of legality to all state
actions are given a particularly anti-fascist formula in the extensive list
of rights protected under Part I of the Constitution. The protection and
enforcement of those rights are advanced by an independent judiciary
and a specialized constitutional court (the Tribunal Constitucional de
España), with additional state resources (such as the Defensor del
Pueblo or Ombud) dedicated to securing the rule of law.168
Additionally, provisions of the Constitution that circumscribe the role
of the military and minimize the official role of the Roman Catholic
Church also promote the rule of law as the foundation of the state.
Part III below further explores these core transformative goals of the
transition toward constitutional democracy and away from autocracy,
authoritarianism, and fascism.
B. The Spanish Model of Constitutional Transition
The final, and in some contexts most important, element to examine
from the Spanish transformation to constitutional democracy is the
process. The so-called Spanish Model of transition to democratic

165 Authoritarianism,
DICTIONARY.COM,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/
authoritarianism?s=t (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
166 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 prelim pt., art. 1, §
1.
167 Id. at prelim. pt., art. 9, § 1, 3.
168 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 152–54.
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constitutionalism is of significant academic and political interest.169
Spain’s transformation, from authoritarian government to
constitutional democracy, held significant appeal to a variety of
countries in the late twentieth centuries and may continue to interest
transitioning nations in the future.
1. Characteristics of the Spanish Model
Although references to a Spanish Model of transformation extend
back to at least 1991,170 there is no unified definition of the precise
characteristics of the model. In general, it describes a relatively
peaceful transition from authoritarianism to democracy through
negotiated, consensus-based reform without rupture of the existing
legal framework through violence or revolution. Maintenance of legal
continuity, the use of pacted negotiation, and the dominance of
consensus-based decision-making are the hallmarks of the Spanish
Model.
The Spanish transition has been termed a “legal revolution.”171 This
refers to the fact that the radical transformation to constitutional
democracy happened without a sociolegal rupture with the extant legal
system: no revolution, no coup, no overthrow of the existing system as
the first step toward change. Rather (and rather surprisingly),
significant initial reform occurred through the formal mechanisms of
the Francoist state. At a critical moment, a royally appointed prime
minister with no democratic legitimacy secured the support of the
former regime’s pseudo-Parliament to hold genuine democratic

169 There are some inevitable and interesting comparisons between the relatively similar
and simultaneous transition experiences of Greek, Portugal, and Spain. Collective
examinations of this third wave of modern European democratization in Southern Europe is
fascinating but not directly relevant to this Article’s thesis. See, e.g., TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: SOUTHERN EUROPE (Guillermo O’Donnell et al. eds., 1986). The
congruent timing is generally considered an “interesting fact” without a compelling “macrolevel explanation.” Robert M. Fishman, Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe’s
Transition to Democracy, 42 WORLD POL. 422, 425 (1990).
170 Josep Colomer, Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way, 85 AMER.
POL. SCI. REV. 1283, 1283 (1991) (“[F]requent and praiseworthy references to the Spanish
model of transition to democracy have been made, generally identifying it with negotiations
and pacts among political elites and consensus among the citizenry that avoid acts of
revenge, violent confrontations, and civil war.”).
171 STANLEY G. PAYNE, SPAIN’S FIRST DEMOCRACY: THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1931–
1936, 49 (1993); see also Antonio-Carlos Pereira Menaut, A Pointless Legal Revolution—
Constitutional Supremacy and EU Membership in Spain, 1978–2015, 30 Tul. Eur. & Civ.
L.F. 81 (2015).
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elections featuring previously banned political parties exercising rights
repressed until that transformative moment.172
Such a gradualist transition avoided the shockwave of collapsing and
re-creating all state institutions simultaneously. Major institutions of
state authority remained in place until they were later lawfully replaced
by new, also lawful, institutions under the new Constitution’s
democratic values and democratic structures. The avoidance of radical
structural disruption also meant that there was no wholesale purge of
the civil service or the judiciary.173 Notably, the contemporaneous
transitions in Portugal and Greece both included a sharper rupture with
the predemocratic state, initiated by the military in both countries.174
The second commonly referenced characteristic of the Spanish
Model is that it was a negotiated transition or “pacted transition” driven
largely by political elites.175 This was possible because of the
nondisruptive nature of the transition, the openness of late-stage
Francoists (especially Suárez) to fair elections, and the relatively weak
electoral support for more extreme political parties and regional
separatists. One author has described the elite nature as “[d]iscrete
agreements and restaurant negotiations.”176 Additionally, the ultimate
elite, King Juan Carlos, offered active support for the political change

172 The Spanish term reforma pactada-rupture pactada (pacted or negotiated reform,
negotiated rupture) describes this process: internal, agreed-upon reforms from within the
system and then an agreed-upon but formally legal break with the prior regime. JUAN J. LINZ
& ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION:
SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 61 (1996).
173 See Fishman, supra note 169, at 430.
174 Id. at 430–31.
175 There is an active academic debate about the relative influence and contributions of
elites and civil society groups. For purposes of this Article, the debate offers little insight.
Indeed, to the extent this Article focuses on the constitutional transition (through the Spanish
Model) rather than the entirety of the post-Franco transition, the role of elites comes into
sharper focus and is less controversial. Anyone who has participated in the drafting process
of a collective statement for a large group of stakeholders knows that it cannot be done with
all the stakeholders actually present. For legitimacy, there must be interplay between
collective guidance and small group drafting. Guidance, redirection, and heavy influence
can come from the larger collection of stakeholders, but a handful of authors will always
achieve more than a mass of even like-minded folks. Of course, this drafting reality is starkly
contrasted with the need for authentic public direction and engagement to secure genuine
collective ownership. Constitutions, as broad collective statements of national values,
political purposes, and governmental structuring, face exponentially larger challenges than
day-to-day groups. Most constitutional processes address this, minimally, through express
election of constituent assembly representatives at the start of the process and popular
ratification at its end.
176 ALONSO & MURO, supra note 2, at 4.
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that was occurring.177 The engagement of the King along with
democratically elected centrists and moderate political parties
permitted substantial change while encouraging moderate, nonpunitive
results. Importantly, this kept the military at bay, watchful but passive,
and diminished the risk of an abortive coup led by reactionary elements
of the armed forces.178
The elite negotiated nature of the constitutional transition also
promoted the use of consensus and avoided one of the oft-referenced
pitfalls of the Second Republic under the Constitution of 1931.
Decision-making through consensus allowed productive involvement
of a larger array of political parties and, indirectly, increased
investment from their collectively larger groups of constituents and
stakeholders (e.g., unions, the armed forces, monarchists, and other
interest groups).179 Of course, some groups excluded themselves from
the process: Basque separatists, extreme groups on the left and right,
and some others.180 But the formal inclusion of groups supported the
image of the transition and inevitably affected the results, giving
compromise a far better chance than it might have otherwise had.
The result of the consensus model is evident when contrasted with
Spain’s other twentieth-century constitution. Most critics of the
Constitution of 1931 saw it as a liberal winner-takes-all document that
targeted institutions that still had significant support in Spanish
society—especially the Catholic Church, the monarchy, and the armed
forces.181 This created allied opponents to the Second Republic and
provided impetus for the Civil War.182 The choice to structure
consensus-based decision-making into the process rejected a nocompromise model that could easily have created numerous
discontents.
Neither this, nor the discussion and evaluation of the Spanish Model
that follows is intended to cast the actual Spanish process of transition
in an ahistorical, sentimental, or overly idealistic light. No historian or
political scientist would suggest purely altruistic motives to historical
actors. Historical motives are as mixed as modern ones—perhaps even

177
178
179
180
181
182

See A King for Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1976, at A24.
CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 220.
Fishman, supra note 169, at 438.
FERRERES, supra note 1, at 2.
See id. at 4.
Id.
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more so when the stakes are as high as a short-term national
transformation. As one commentator noted in 1989,
Spaniards feared a return to the anarchic bloodletting of the civil war;
they were determined not to let it happen again. King Juan Carlos
feared the anti-monarchist sentiments among the newly legalized
Socialists. The military feared a purge, and the left feared the
military. By turning its back on old scores, and on its own bloodstained history, Spain achieved the transition.183

But, regardless of underlying motives, the procedural design that
resulted in the Spanish Model offered a generally successful,
compelling, and possibly exportable model for constitutional
transformation.
2. Appeal of the Spanish Model
There is little doubt that the Spanish Model has been attractive to
later constitutional transitions. Since the time of Spain’s
transformation, the Iron Curtain has come down, Apartheid ended, and
a variety of countries in South America, North Africa, and Asia
transitioned away from one version of authoritarianism or another. As
a consequence, the Spanish process was a potential model for nations
from such diverse places as post-Communist Eastern Europe, postApartheid South Africa, and Northern Africa following the Arab
Spring.184
For a host of nations, Spain provided a promising approach to stable,
nonviolent transformation As early as 1989, one news article
specifically referenced Poland, Hungary, Tunisia, Argentina, and
Mexico, saying:
[T]he Spanish model remains the most compelling one, and not only
for Latin American nations like Argentina or Mexico that were once
Spanish colonies. After the violent failure of heroic rebellions and
upheavals in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968, Eastern European innovators see Spain’s

183 James Markham, There’s a Demand of Instruction in Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
16, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/16/weekinreview/the-world-there-s-ademand-for-instruction-in-democracy.html.
184 See, e.g., Paloma Aguilar & Clara Ramírez-Barat, Past Injustices, Memory Politics
and Transitional Justice in Spain, in THE ARAB TRANSITIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD:
BUILDING DEMOCRACIES IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 56 (Senén Florensa
ed. 2016); see generally Charles Powell, Revisiting Spain’s Transition to Democracy, in
THE ARAB TRANSITIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD: BUILDING DEMOCRACIES IN LIGHT OF
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 38 (Senén Florensa ed. 2016).
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gradualist transition to full democracy as an alternative to bold but
doomed leaps to freedom.185

Notably, this favorable view of Spain’s transition is shared by Spaniards
as well. In a 2001 poll, eighty-six percent of Spaniards were proud of their
transition.186
These favorable opinions highlight the value of examining the
potential value of the Spanish Model beyond the Iberian Peninsula in
addition to evaluating the value of the transformation to Spain itself.
The remainder of this Article assesses the Spanish Model’s success in
transitioning Spain away from Francoist authoritarianism and toward
constitutional democracy—and evaluates the viability of foreign
adoption of this model of democratic transformation.
III
TRANSFORMATIVE AND REACTIVE ELEMENTS OF SPANISH
CONSTITUTIONALISM
The Spanish constitutional transition was animated by entwined
motivations: a desire to craft a new state in the model of modern
constitutional democracies and a reaction against the disfavored
elements of the Franco regime. Hence, Spain’s affirmative
transformation is inseparable from its denunciation of its recent past.
At a high level of generality, it is relatively easy to identify the primary
perceived failings of Franco’s Spain from the perspective of the late
twentieth century constitutional drafters. But closer examination of the
process and the substantive choices of the authors show the interplay
of the negative and positive motives. Moreover, it evinces how these
particular transformative purposes were advanced by the Spanish
Model of democratic transition.
This Part focuses on three of the worst characteristics of
preconstitutional Spain in order to highlight the transformative changes
introduced by the 1978 Constitution. Autocracy, authoritarianism, and
fascism are overlapping and related characteristics of Francoist Spain.
For purposes of the analysis below, they are treated distinctly to support
a close examination of the modern Spanish response in the values and
textual provisions of the 1978 Constitution.

Markham, supra note 183.
ALONSO & MURO, supra note 2, at 3. Notably, this polling precedes the economic
downturn of the early 2000s and the enlivened Catalonian independence crisis.
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A. Democratic Constitutional Monarchy Replaces Autocratic Rule
The nature of an autocracy is the effective collection of power in an
individual without limitation from state institutions, other independent
sources of authority, or the people themselves. Despite its moderately
liberalizing evolution from the 1930s to the 1970s, Franco’s Spain
certainly meets these criteria. The primary response to this
characteristic is the creation of genuinely democratic institutions,
which diffuse the previously unified powers among the voting-age
populace and their elected representatives. But in Spain, the retort to
autocratic rule also required a delicate but decisive reframing of two
historically important institutions: the monarchy and the quasiindependent regions.
1. Democratic Structures and Rights
Under the 1978 Constitution, the Kingdom of Spain became a
modern parliamentary democracy. In fact, Spain held democratic
elections in 1977, the year before the democratic Constitution came
into force.187 Spain’s elections involve universal adult suffrage
conducted through free, fair, and confidential processes.188 At the
national level, representatives are elected into one of the two chambers
of the Cortes Generales, located in Madrid.189 The 350 members190 of
the Congress of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados) generally serve
four-year terms selected through party-list proportional representation
in their provinces.191 Because it is a parliamentary system, a majority
vote of the Congreso selects the prime minister as the head of the
government.192 The 266 members of the Senado (Senate) serve co-

See CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 227.
Manuel Álvarez-Rivera, Election Resources on the Internet: Elections to the Spanish
Congress of Deputies (July 24, 2016), http://electionresources.org/es/index_en.
html#ASPECTS.
189 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978. pt. III, ch. 1, art.
68.
190 The precise number of Deputies and Senators is based on the General Electoral
Regime Organic Law (5/1985; June 19, 1985), within a constitutional range of 300–400.
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978. pt. III, ch. 1, art. 68, § 1.
191 Spain’s parliamentary model follows the D’Hondt (or Jeffersonian) Method, which
slightly favors larger parties.
192 Although the elected leader of the Congreso is formally the President of the
Government of Spain (Presidente del Gobierno de España), the role is functionally that of
a prime minister of the parliamentary body.
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terminus four-year terms. Senado seats favor rural constituencies
because representation is not entirely apportioned by population.193
Although the Cortes Generales is bicameral, the chambers are not
on an equal footing. The Congreso can overrule many Senado actions
and the lower house has additional independent authority not shared by
the upper house.194 The Senado’s independent powers are much more
limited. The most important and contentious of its powers is its
capacity to suspend local governments, which it did in October 2017 in
relation to the Catalonia independence crisis.195
The national legislature is joined by a host of other democratically
elected institutions in the autonomous communities, provinces, and
municipalities. Each level of government is guaranteed “selfgovernment for the management of their respective interests.”196 Even
trade unions, political parties, and professional associations must
function democratically under the Constitution.197
Democracy, the antithesis of autocracy, is mentioned twice in the
Preamble of the Constitution of 1978 (to “guarantee democratic
existence” and “establish an advanced democratic society”) and in the
first sentence of Section 1.198 These democratic values and the
multilevel democratic institutions crafted by the Constitution are a
direct and immediate response to Franco’s autocratic rule. The
Constitution created democratic state institutions that allow for
representation of voter will and the political will of regional and local
institutions. They replace the unelected rubber stamp Cortes and the
pseudo-democratic municipal committees of the Franco era.
Obviously, the creation and empowerment of democratic institutions
directly advances the affirmative goal of becoming a modern

193 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 pt. III, ch. 1, art.
69, § 5. Typically, the four seats for each province are all won by the most popular party in
that province. An additional fifty-eight senators are selected by the legislative assemblies of
each autonomous community. Each region gets one additional senator for each one million
citizens. Because senators are representatives of their regions, they may be recalled by their
regional legislatures. NEWTON, supra note 80, at 47.
194 NEWTON, supra note 80, at 46–48.
195 Sam Jones et. al., Spain Dissolves Catalan Parliament and Calls Fresh Elections,
THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Oct. 28, 2017), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017
/oct/27/spanish-pm-mariano-rajoy-asks-senate-powers-dismiss-catalonia-president.
196 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 pt. VIII, ch. 1, art.
137.
197 Id. at prelim. pt. art. 6, 7; ch. 2, § 2, art. 36; and ch. 3, art. 52.
198 Id. at pmbl.
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constitutional democracy. It also rejects in principle and effect, the
unification of power typified by Franco’s autocratic state.
2. Regionalism, Ethnocultural Nationalism, and Autonomy
As discussed above, the Constitution of 1931 allowed significantly
more autonomy for the historical regions with strong ethno-cultural
identities than was permitted before or after that brief period. The most
heavily historically identified regions—especially the Basque Country
and Catalonia—were given significant autonomy under the Statutes of
Autonomy.199 These Statutes allowed regions to regulate a noteworthy
number of local, domestic matters and to exhibit and promote their own
language, culture, and history.
Conservative forces in Spain were violently opposed to the idea. The
autocratic nature of Francoism required centralization. Subnational
autonomy, or peripheral nationalism, was considered an existential
threat as worrisome as communism or atheism.200 Throughout the
Franco era, the regions with strong national identities were targeted for
special oppression.201 Non-Castilian languages like Catalan and
Euskadi were targeted with repressive laws and punishment. Any
promotion of regional independence was violently addressed by the
national government.202
The transition period following Franco’s death offered great
potential to the autonomy-minded regions. But there was significant
doubt that the former Francoists who remained in power would allow
genuine autonomy even once the transition to democracy began.203 In
fact, there appeared to be little consensus on the issue of centralized or
decentralized power. The heirs of Franco on the right wanted a
minimum amount of decentralization, while the parties on the left,
including the regional parties of course, supported some version of
federalism (in the absence of actual independence). An unlikely form
of consensus resulted: both views found a home in the ratified text of
the Constitution.
See CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 9, 1931 pt. I.
PRESTON, supra note 42, at 53–54.
201 Omar G. Encarnación, The Ghost of Franco Still Haunts Catalonia, FOR. POL’Y,
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/05/the-ghost-of-franco-still-hauntscatalonia/.
202 Goldie Shabad & Richard Gunther, Language, Nationalism, and Political Conflict in
Spain, 14 COMP. POL. 443, 443 (1982); see also PRESTON, supra note 42, at 53–54.
203 The animosity was strong enough that the Basque country excluded itself from much
of the constitutional drafting process and urged its voters to shun the ratification vote. CARR
& FUSI, supra note 66, at 244–45; PRESTON, supra note 71, at 144–46, 150.
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In the absence of precise agreement, the constitutional drafters tried
to postpone the inevitable conflict with a constitution of multiple
possible solutions. Hence, the Constitution of 1978 asserts the
“indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible
homeland of all Spaniards” while acknowledging the right to “selfgovernment of the nationalities and regions.”204 The drafters elected to
delay confrontation on the contentious issue so that regional autonomy
did not derail the entire transition:
“[I]n the exercise of the right to self-government recognized [in] the
Constitution,”205 the Constitution recognizes but does not identify
examples of “Self-governing Communities that may be constituted.”206
As a result, the Constitution of 1978 attempted to have both unity and
regional autonomy. Rather than establishing fixed determinations
about regional competence, the issue of decentralized authority and
regional autonomy was primarily left to a nuanced democratic process
of writing and soliciting approval of a Statute of Autonomy that defined
areas of governmental competence. Thus, the Constitution allowed
regions to “accede to self-government and form Self-governing
Communities (Comunidades Autónomas)”207 at their own initiation.
Because each Autonomous Community negotiates the mechanisms and
details of its own authority, each Community has a unique set of
competencies and authority. The result is a form of “asymmetrical
federalism,”208 where the division of national and regional powers and
responsibilities varies by Community. Indeed, the process of proposing
areas of competence through a Statute of Autonomy may be regularly
repeated (every five years) to alter or otherwise adjust competencies
within the bounds laid out in the Constitution.209
In this way, the drafters of the Constitution included the limited areas
of consensus in the text of the Constitution and insisted on a moderate
204
205
206

CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 prelim. pt., art. 2.
Id. at pt. VIII, ch. 3, art. 143.
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 pt. VIII, ch. 1, art.

137.
Id.
See generally Luis Moreno, Asymmetry in Spain: Federalism in the Making?, in
ACCOMMODATING DIVERSITY: ASYMMETRY IN FEDERAL STATES 149 (Nomos
Verlagsgesellshaft Baden-Baden; Robert Agranoff, ed. 1999); see also Esther Seijas
Villadangos, Answers to Spanish Centrifugal Federalism: Asymmetrical Federalism Versus
Coercive Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON FEDERALISM 164 (2014), http://www.onfederalism.eu/attachments/185_download.pdf.
209 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 pt. VIII, ch. 1, art.
148–49.
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208
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result, i.e., a negotiated framework for future definition of relative
autonomy. The Spanish Model’s focus on consensus and moderation is
evident in the decision not to decide beyond the limited areas of
agreement. Any other approach could have produced winners and
losers who may have threatened the larger transformational project.
This shows another value of the Spanish Model. By deciding less, the
drafters accomplished more. Moreover, the process that would
ultimately apportion power between particular Autonomous
Communities and the national government was structured to resemble
the constitutional transition model: a binding agreement requires
negotiated consensus between state and Community leadership,
heightened majority requirements to ensure broad agreement, and the
avoidance of extreme results (because of the extant constitutional
limits). These constitutionally hard-wired requirements ensure the
successful procedural characteristics of the drafting era are extended
beyond the special, constitutional moment.
3. The Role of the Constitutional Monarch
It would be disingenuous to discuss the constitutional reaction
against autocracy without addressing the (perhaps surprising)
constitutional role of the Spanish monarch. From the peninsular
unification in the Golden Age of Spain under Queen Isabella and King
Ferdinand to the present King Felipe VI,210 the Spanish monarchy has
always played a decisive role in Spanish history. Most of Spain’s
constitutions have been monarchical.211 Even following declaration of
the Second Republic and renunciation of the royal line in the
Constitution of 1931, the exiled King Alfonso XIII acted as a rallying
cry for important elements supporting Franco in the Civil War.212
Of course, Franco failed to restore the monarchy following his
victory in the Civil War, instead consolidating power in himself.
Nevertheless, the monarchy was central to Franco’s plan for governing
Spain after his own death. Alfonso’s grandson, whom Franco
considered more reliably aligned to Franco’s vision of Spain than
210 The current King is Felipe VI. Felipe became the Spanish King on June 19, 2014,
when his father King Juan Carlos I abdicated in his favor. Rafael Minder, Spain’s Incoming
King Takes Over a Throne Heavy With Political Tension,
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2014, at A7.
211 Adam Przewarski et al., The Origins of Parliamentary Responsibility, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 116–17 (Tom Ginsburg, ed. 2011).
212 PRESTON, supra note 42, at 37, 209–10, 224; PAYNE, supra note 72, at 41–42; CARR
& FUSI, supra note 66, at 33–35.
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Alfonso’s son, would become King Juan Carlos I upon Franco’s
death.213 Juan Carlos had been guided, counseled, and supported by
Franco in the last decade of his regime.214 However, Juan Carlos’s
commitment to democracy was greater than his loyalty to the deceased
dictator. The restored monarch announced public support for
democratization soon after his return to power in 1975,215 and in 1976,
appointed the reform-minded Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister of
Spain, who helped lead Spain to constitutional democracy.216
King Juan Carlos’s support for democratic reforms was certainly one
reason that the new Constitution included a role for the king and the
royal family. But the Constitution of 1978 is nothing like early Spain’s
constitutional monarchies, none of which effectively limited royal
control over the government.217 Part II of the Constitution details a
visible but carefully circumscribed role for the monarch. The monarch
is given a variety of formal but largely symbolic powers by the
Constitution: promulgating laws, summoning the Cortes Generales,
appointment of government officials on the prime minister’s proposal,
and others as one would expect in a “Parliamentary Monarchy,” as the
Constitution identifies Spain.218 But, the king must make an oath “to
obey the Constitution and the laws and ensure that they are obeyed, and
to respect the rights of citizens and the Self-governing Communities”219
And, his acts are invalid unless countersigned by the prime minister or
other ministers, denying him any actual legislative role.220
Including a public role for the monarchy provides “a symbol of
[Spain’s] unity and permanence.” And, subsuming the monarch’s role
into the Constitution, as is done by Section 56 and other provisions,
both accentuates the new state’s legitimacy and allows historical
continuity within the transformative framework of the new
Constitution. The compromise of retaining a figurative role for the
See FERRERES, supra note 1, at 72.
Portent for a King, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1975, at 28 (“From the outset, Juan Carlos
heavily mortgaged his future to Franco at his designation when he swore on his knees in
front of the Generalissimo to uphold Spain’s laws and institutions.”).
215 Id.
216 PRESTON, supra note 71, at 92–93.
217 Przewarski et al., supra note 211.
218 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 prelim. pt., art. 1, §
3.
219 Id. at pt. II, art. 61, § 1.
220 Id. at pt. II, art. 64, § 1; id. at art. 56, § 3. The only exception to this rule is that the
King may “appoint and dismiss the civil and military members of his Household.” Id. at art.
65, § 2.
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monarchy also fits perfectly within the Spanish Model of transition. A
monarchic role satisfied traditionalists and placated the military
without threatening the core democratic transformation. It reflected a
consensus of the centrist elites on the left and right of the political
spectrum and avoided an inflammatory result like the one made in the
Constitution of 1931. In some ways, the inclusion of a democratically
restrained monarch was a constitutional decision emblematic of the
Spanish Model.
B. The Rule of Law Replaces Authoritarianism
The importance of establishing the newly democratic Spain as a
nation under the rule of law is evident in the earliest words of the new
Constitution. The second clause of the Preamble declares the intent to
“consolidate a State of Law (Estado de Derecho) which ensures the
rule of law as the expression of the popular will.”221 This idea of a state
that enshrines and advances the rule of law is utterly contrary to
Franco-era authoritarianism. An Estado de Derecho is a sharp rebuke
to the classic authoritarian focus on a single leader’s power and current
desires over fixed, enforceable rules that apply to everyone.222 It rejects
such a regime’s insistence on unity of party and ruler, malleability of
legal rules, and oppression of dissent at the ruler’s caprice.
The significance of this idea is immediately embodied in Part I of
the Constitution, where the drafters presented the overarching tenets of
the new Spanish state. Section 1 of the Constitution declares, “Spain is
hereby established as a social and democratic state, subject to the rule
of law, which advocates freedom, justice, equality, and political
pluralism as the highest values in its legal system.”223 The meaning and
effect of being an Estado de Derecho is made expressly and abundantly
clear in the same Preliminary Part of the Constitution:
Citizens and public authorities are bound by the Constitution and all
other legal provisions. . . . The Constitution guarantees the principle
of legality, the hierarchy of legal provisions, the publicity of legal
statutes, the non-retroactivity of punitive provisions . . . , the certainty
that the rule of law shall prevail, the accountability of public

CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 pmbl.
Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “authoritarian” as “of, relating to, or favoring a
concentration of power in a leader or an elite not constitutionally responsible to the people.”
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/authoritarianism?utm_campaign=sd&utm_me
dium=serp&utm_source=jsonld.
223 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 prelim. pt.
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authorities, and the prohibition of arbitrary action of public
authorities.224

Such a comprehensive and emphatic assertion of the importance of
the rule of law in the newly democratic Spain is an unmitigated rebuke
to the malleability of law as a tool to serve authoritarian ends in the
prior era. This section will focus on this fundamental role for the rule
of law in the textual provisions of the Constitution, the enforceability
of constitutional (and other) norms through adjudication, and the
constitutional reply to the nongovernmental authoritarian institutions,
Spain’s “de facto powers”: the Spanish military and the Catholic
Church.
1. A Rule of Law Constitution
First on the list of critiques of any authoritarian state must be the
absence of rule of law. Using the raw power of governmental authority,
rather than the force of established law, is the hallmark of
authoritarianism. The ruler, or the ruling elite, is the law.
Authoritarianism is a particular form of lawlessness that allows the
current desires of the leader or ruling class to dominate over established
procedures, community values, or any fixed national principles. A
lawfully established, enduring, and enforceable constitution is the most
common foundation for the rule of law in the modern era. To the extent
it fixes and enforces rules of governance, a constitution is a direct
refutation of lawlessness or authoritarianism.
At the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War, Franco took on his
various dictatorial titles (most prominently head of state for life),
banned opposition political parties, repudiated the Constitution of
1931, and established his own government supported by a puppet
legislature.225 As a consequence, Franco’s Spain functioned without a
democratic constitution, without express or enforceable rights
guarantees, and without an independent judiciary. Although there are
many other vital elements of a government under law, the absence of a
legally enforceable, rights-based democratic constitution is a glaring
absence. The lack in Franco’s Spain is even more exceptional, because
the middle decades of Francoism were a period of triumphant
constitutionalism and rights ascendency globally. The post-War period

Id. at prelim. pt., art. 9, § 1, 3.
See generally PAUL PRESTON, FRANCO (Fontana, 1995); STANLEY G. PAYNE &
JESÚS PALACIOS, FRANCO: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (2014).
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witnessed dozens of new constitutions226 and passage of the United
Nation’s International Bill of Rights and the Council of Europe’s
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.227
The direct response to the absence of rule of law in the Franco era
is, of course, the 1978 Constitution itself. From a legal perspective, this
is most evident in the thoughtful provisions to enact and enforce
statutes, the structuring of multilevel state power, and the fixed
distribution of power among state institutions. Additionally, an
enforceable bill of rights is a specific, purposeful bulwark to the harm
authoritarian governments can effect on individuals. The provisions of
the Constitution of 1978 satisfy all these elements. For rule of law, the
constitutional provisions are “law”; “rule” comes from the
enforceability of these constitutional limits and compliance of
governmental institutions with these legal norms.
In Spain, the constitutional support for the rule of law takes on
additional forms. Not only does the Constitution enumerate general
civil and political rights—for example, free expression, political
participation, and criminal procedural protections—but other
provisions respond directly to the sins of the prior regime. For example,
the Constitution’s prohibition on the death penalty was in response to
the deadly, repressive early history of the Franco regime.228 Similarly,
the Constitution’s extensive protections for those accused of crimes and
detained by the state are easily explicable as a response to the
dictatorship’s prolific detention of political enemies.229 Even the
elements of sex equality in the Constitution can be viewed as a reaction
to the oppressive sexism of the Civil War and Franco eras.230
Overall, entrenchment of principles of the rule of law is a core value
woven throughout the Constitution, and this is reflected in the
consensus of the drafting period. The rule of law elements were novel
for Spain, but not controversial. The provisions advancing the rule of
law in the Constitution of 1978 were not subject to significant
negotiation or compromise in the constitutional process when it became
clear to the Francoist old guard that the era of authoritarianism was
over. This was clear with the 1977 election results, if not sooner. There
226 Timeline of Constitutions, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, http://
comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/chronology/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
227 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 155; Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 131.
228 See CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 19.
229 PRESTON, supra note 42, at 319–21.
230 Eric Solsten & Sandra W. Meditz, Social Values and Attitudes, SPAIN: A COUNTRY
STUDY (1988), http://countrystudies.us/spain/43.htm.
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was little evident popular support for continuation of the prior regime,
and any moves toward constitutionalism and democracy were
implicitly moves toward a state subject to the rule of law.
2. The Role of the Spanish Judiciary
The judiciary is a central tool of an Estado de Derecho because it
embodies much of the fixity and enforceability of legal rules. In
organizing the judicial power in a constitutional democracy, the core
focus is upon separating judicial determinations from democratic
lawmaking, consolidating the power of adjudication in the courts, and
protecting the independence of the judiciary. Legal determinations can
then be based on established laws through fair and open processes
separated from the prejudice and preferences of rulers, and from the
short-term interests of those in power. This is an essential element of
effective governance by rule of law. Part VI of the Constitution
establishes a judicial branch of government with judges “accountable
for their acts and subject only to the rule of law.”231 This Part secures
the other characteristics of a fair and independent judiciary in its
organization of court and judges: “The exercise of judicial authority in
any kind of action, both in ruling and having judgments executed, is
vested exclusively in the courts and tribunals laid down by the law, in
accordance with the rules of jurisdiction and procedure which may be
established therein.”232
Because Spain’s Constitution was drafted a generation after most
Western European constitutions, Spain could rely heavily on the
models of other countries, particularly Italy, for the structuring and
functioning of its courts.233 This also served the purpose of affirming
Spain’s modern democratic bona fides for the European Communities
and the Council of Europe, which it sought to join in its new era. As a
consequence, although it was an essential component of the
transformation from Francoist authoritarianism to modern
constitutionalism, the provisions on the Spanish judiciary were not
controversial and thus not subject to heavy negotiation or compromise.
However, not all Franco-era power bases drew lawful power from
state institutions or were unquestionably willing to constrict their own
231

CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. VI, art. 117, §

1.
Id. at pt. VI, art. 117, § 3.
Comparative Constitutionalism in Practice, supra note 153. López, supra note 153,
at 530–32.
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accustomed authority to the new Estado de Derecho. The next two
sections discuss the “de facto powers”: the Spanish armed forces and
the Roman Catholic Church.234
3. The Military’s Role in the New Democracy
Historically, the military was a critically important support for
dictatorial and authoritarian rule in Spain. The armed forces in Spain
have always played an expansive role in support of the monarchy, and
in twentieth-century Spain that role took on quasi-political dimensions.
Most notably, Franco entered the attack on the Second Republic from
his position as a general in the armed forces.235 After the Civil War, the
military remained a core pillar of Franco’s power, perceiving itself as
the last defense of Spain.236 Moreover, the fact that the military was the
means of destruction of Spain’s earlier attempt at democracy in the
Second Republic was often present in the minds of Spaniards working
on the transition.237
By the end of Franco’s reign, the military was definitively aligned
with conservative political elements, the monarchy, and other
traditionalist Spanish institutions.238 Many in the military perceived its
role to be that of protector of a notion of a true Spain. This resulted in
an abiding military connection to the status quo and the traditionalist
elements glorified by Franco. A common (and realistic) concern during
Spain’s transition to democracy was whether the military would
overcome its authoritarian impulses and support the democratic
Constitution.239
In the transition, the Cortes, the drafters, and the political parties had
to keep an eye on the military as they feared interference.240 Because
of the fears of democratically inclined elites, the military was
accommodated by multiple elements of the Spanish Model. The muchdiscussed “moderation” of constitutional decision-making and
“consensus” in the process were significantly the result of attempts to
ensure that the military did not halt the transition through force.241 The
NEWTON, supra note 80, at 18–19.
PRESTON, supra note 42, at 131.
236 Id. at 3–4.
237 PAUL PRESTON, THE POLITICS OF REVENGE: FASCISM AND THE MILITARY IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SPAIN, 127 (1995).
238 CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 21–24.
239 See generally PRESTON, supra note 42, at 171.
240 PRESTON, supra note 71, at 98–100, 129–31, 146–50, 195–204, and 206–07.
241 Id.
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support of the king, changes in military leadership arranged by Suárez
prior to the formal transition, and the gradualist nature of the transition
kept the threat of a military coup low.242 Additionally, the continuity of
the existing legal framework diminished the excuse for military
intervention.
The actual constitutional text is somewhat more expansive than one
would expect in light of the acute concerns during the drafting period
about military interference. Article 8 of the Constitution declares the
role of the military is “to safeguard the sovereignty and independence
of Spain, defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order.”243
Notably, this role addresses the habitual resistance to decentralization
by giving the military a role in keeping the regions from
unconstitutional splits with Madrid.244 But most of the details of the
constitutional duties and democratic accountability of the military were
postponed. The Constitution allowed for a later organic law to work out
the details,245 a strategy that naturally minimized objections. As with
issues of regional autonomy, the Spanish Model of transition facilitated
consensus on moderate principles and postponed contentious details for
a later date. This allowed the constitutional transition to advance
without forcible objection from the armed forces.
Indeed, these concerns were legitimate; the military did carry out a
nearly successful coup d’état very soon after the transition. On
February 23, 1981, armed members of Spain’s Civil Guard led by
Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero took control of a meeting of the Congress
of Deputies that was selecting a new prime minister.246 The coup was
motivated, in part, by the issues that the armed forces had long
opposed: devolution of power to the regions, renewed violence caused
by Basque separatists, and the uncertainties of democracy.247 However,
the coup eventually failed. King Juan Carlos I appeared on television
during the early morning of February 24 while the Deputies were still
See generally id.
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 prelim. pt., art. 8.
244 NEWTON, supra note 80, at 18–19. This is also true of the primary governing
legislation, the Organic Law on National Defense and Military Organization, 1980.
245 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 prelim. pt., art. 8, §
2.
246 PRESTON, supra note 71, at 195–202.
247 See generally JAVIER CERCAS, ANATOMY OF A MOMENT: THIRTY–FIVE MINUTES
IN HISTORY AND IMAGINATION (Anne McLean trans., Bloomsbury 2011). The “thirty-five
minutes” refers to a live recording of the first moments of the coup later widely shown on
television after the coup failed; see generally PRESTON, supra note 237, at ch. 8.
242
243

50

OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20, 1

being held hostage.248 Appearing in his uniform as Captain General of
the Armed Forces, the king rebuked the coup participants, and stated
that “[t]he Crown, the symbol of permanence and unity of the nation,
cannot tolerate, in any form, the actions or behavior of anyone
attempting by force to interrupt the democratic process of the
Constitution, which the Spanish people approved at the time of the
referendum.”249 The statement damaged the asserted purpose to restore
the monarchy and challenged the claims that the military was acting on
behalf of the Spanish people. Along with other factors, the king’s
actions facilitated the ultimate failure of the coup eighteen hours after
the deputies had been seized by the members of the Civil Guard.
The failed coup weakened the influence of the military leadership
but left untouched its constitutional and organic law authority. The later
convictions of the coup leaders and others associated with the coup 250
had the result of strengthening the rule of law by demonstrating that
even one of the “de facto powers” with a long history of influence was
subject to the Constitution and the rule of law.251 Of course, one
additional result of the coup was that it strongly reinforced support for
Juan Carlos I and the Spanish monarchy, and reaffirmed the viability
of Spain’s fledgling democracy.
4. Catholicism and the State
Religion, especially Roman Catholicism, has always been a
significant factor in Spanish self-definition and Spanish politics. From
the rule of Isabella and Ferdinand, the “Reyes Catolicos” of Spain’s
Golden Era, to the significant constitutional debate about the role of the
typically pro-Francoist Church in the constitutional democracy
launched in 1978, the Roman Catholic Church has long been concerned
with its relation to Spain and vice versa.252 Catholicism was a core
characteristic by which fifteenth-century Spain defined itself as a
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nation.253 Iberian Spain was intended to be united as a Catholic country
reclaimed from centuries of Muslim occupation.254 Religion often
dictated international relations, most obviously as one of the motives
for Spain’s global expansion through empire.255 Spreading the Catholic
faith justified conquest and colonialism and defending it was a defining
duty of the monarchs over the centuries.
Contrarily, the denial of special prerogatives to the Church defined
the modern, liberal state created in the Constitution of 1931. The
Second Republic’s secularist vision of Spain stood in sharp contrast to
the preceding centuries of Catholic or divided Catholic and Muslim
rule. It was also a prime motive and rallying cry for traditionalists and
nationalists in the Spanish Civil War.256
The “antireligious” restrictions on Catholicism in the Constitution
of 1931 yielded to a triumphant association (and robust support) of the
Catholic Church with Franco’s rebellion and regime.257 One of the
defining characteristics of Spain under Franco was its close and
complementary relationship with the Roman Catholic Church. Each
affirmed the authority of the other to augment its own power.258 Indeed,
one historian described Catholicism as “the most potent weapon in the
right-wing armoury” during the Spanish Civil War—although noting
that the tool was, “to a certain extent, placed there by Republican and
Socialist impudence” in 1931.259 These historical swings between
significant authority and minimal influence for the Spanish Church—
more commonly, significant influence—defined Spain until 1978.
It was inevitable that the role of religion, and more specifically
Catholicism, would be a contentious issue in the Constitution of 1978.
Indeed, constitutional decision-making in this area seems to be more
particularly good evidence of the compromise and moderation of the
Spanish Model. Consistent with the Model, the Constitution did not
return to the secularism of the Constitution of 1931 nor did it continue
Id.
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the symbiotic relationship of Franco’s Spain. Instead, it exhibits rightsbased liberalism in the form of modern constitutional religious liberty
protections and it also embraces the special historical and cultural
significance of Roman Catholicism. These related constitutional
elements certainly exhibit some tension, but at the very least they have
mitigated the claims of anticlericalism from the Constitution of 1931
and the excessive entanglement of church and state in the Franco era.260
Hence, the Constitution includes traditional religious liberty rights,
robust freedom of belief, and freedom to practice one’s religion:
“Freedom of ideology, religion and worship of individuals and
communities is guaranteed, with no other restriction on their expression
than may be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law.”261
Additionally, one’s religion may not be subject to forced disclosure, a
provision clearly responsive to elements of enforced confessionalism
during the Franco regime.262 And, of course, religion is a prohibited
ground of discrimination in the equality clause of the Constitution.263
However, the Spanish treatment of religion is not secularist nor
purely focused on individuals’ religious liberty. Instead, the
Constitution requires neutrality with a notable exception. Although it
states that “[n]o religion shall have a state character,” it nevertheless
requires some special accommodation of Catholicism by state entities:
“The public authorities shall take into account the religious beliefs of
Spanish society and shall consequently maintain appropriate
cooperative relations with the Catholic Church and other
confessions.”264 This latter element is justified as an acknowledgement
of the important historical role of the Spanish Catholic Church,

260 It should be noted that the Roman Catholic Church’s own views about engagement
with official state institutions generally and with Franco particularly evolved importantly
during the twentieth century, particularly following the Second Vatican Council when the
Church embraced the reality of plural faiths in traditionally Catholic states. Javier MartinezTorrón, Religious Freedom and Democratic Change in Spain, 2006 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 777,
790 (2006).
261 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 2, § 1, art.
16, § 1.
262 “No one may be compelled to make statements regarding his or her ideology, religion
or beliefs.” CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 2, §
1, art. 16, § 2.
263 Id. at pt. I, ch. 2, art. 14; and “The public authorities guarantee the right of parents to
ensure that their children receive religious and moral instruction in accordance with their
own convictions.” Id. at pt. I, ch. 2, § 21, art. 27, § 2.
264 Id. at pt. I, ch. 2, § 1, art. 16, § 3.
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inseparable from Spain’s historical self-understanding and the
substantial majority of Spaniards who identify as Catholic.265
This special relationship arguably creates tension with the equality
clause’s nondiscrimination language and the general neutrality model
of the religious liberty provisions. Some elements of Spanish churchstate relations are fairly common, while others carry accommodation
close to favoritism.266 As with regional autonomy and military issues,
the Constitution leaves many of the details to special legislation to
decide. This occurred with passage of the Organic Law of Religious
Freedom in July 1980, the first such organic law completed after
ratification.267 Although the Constitution does not require an organic
law to clarify the state’s accommodation of the Catholic Church (as it
did with other contentious issues), the number and sensitivity of issues
argued for such clarification. The use of the absolute majority
legislative process also has the effect of continuing the drafting
period’s consensus model.
The Spanish example of moderation and compromise, where present
provisions are improved through examination of past mistakes, reflects
a fascinating alternative approach to Spain’s previous models. Prior
constitutional missteps—winner-take-all provisions with insufficient
popular support, radical changes to the status quo, or too many changes
at once—were mostly avoided. Even in the area of church-state
relations, where the Spanish position of compromise favors religion far
more than most Western nations would permit, the Spanish Model
serves the goal of successful transition with sensitivity to uniquely
Spanish factors. In a contentious sociolegal area, the carefully

265 Seventy-five percent of Spaniards identify as Roman Catholic but only a small
minority are actively religious and participate regularly in Catholic rituals. Giles Tremlett,
Spain is Still a Very Roman Catholic Country, but Times are Changing, THE GUARDIAN,
(Mar. 31, 2011) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/31/neweurope-spaincatholics-church-influence. In fact, Spain signed a series of four agreements about churchstate relations with the Vatican just one week after the Constitution was ratified. Javier
Martinez-Torrón, supra note 260, at 794 (2006).
266 For example, religious bodies receive organizational tax breaks, their direct donors
also receive tax incentives for supporting their religions, and there are some forms of direct
financial assistance available to registered religious groups. Currently, this third benefit is
only received by the Catholic Church. Additionally, religious instruction occurs in public
schools as well. See, e.g., id. at 725–36.
267 LEY ORGÁNICA 7/1980, DE 5 DE JULIO, DE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA [Organic Law of
Religious Liberty] (July 1980), http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1980/07/24/pdfs/A1680416805.pdf.
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negotiated compromise served an important “pacifying function.”268
This was possible because the 1978 Constitution avoided creating
either another Catholic confessional state or a purposively secularist
state.
C. Entrenched Constitutional Rights Replace Fascism
Spain in the Franco era can be understood as fascist, especially in
the earliest years, because it was a regime that valued the state over
individual or regional interests, with a centralized autocratic
government headed by an authoritarian leader that exhibited rigid
economic and social regimentation through forcible suppression of any
political opposition or contrary social movements.269 While many of
the elements of the 1978 Constitution are directly contrary to Spain’s
past fascist characteristics, the focus of this section is on the adoption
of the twentieth-century model of human rights protections. Human
rights regimes were the international legal response to the global
calamity caused by fascism in the Second World War. Spain was a
tardy member to U.N. and European human rights institutions because
its authoritarian government lasted decades longer than those of the
Axis powers. The result was that democratic Spain established a
belated domestic rights framework in an already existing international
human rights environment.
1. The Role of Spain’s Tribunal Constitucional
For purposes of this Article, I have separated the discussion of the
Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional de España)
from the Spanish judiciary. This is justified by their distinct functions
and by differing roles in the transition to constitutional democracy.
Where the role of the regular Spanish judiciary was a traditional
judicial role, serving the rule of law generally, the Constitutional Court
has a more specialized role as guarantor of the promises in the
Constitution. To the extent a constitution makes binding promises,
there must be an institution to enforce them. In Spain, as in most
countries, that institution is a constitutional court.270 The Court polices
FERRERES, supra note 1, at 22–23.
Merriam Webster Dictionary defines fascism as “a political philosophy, movement,
or regime . . . that exalts nation and often race above the individual and that stands for a
centralized autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, severe economic and social
regimentation, and forcible suppression of opposition.” Fascism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fascism.
270 Lech Garlicki, Constitutional Courts Versus Supreme Courts, 5 INTL J. CONST. L.
44, 44 (2007).
268
269

2018] Forty Years from Fascism: Democratic Constitutionalism
and the Spanish Model of National Transformation

55

the constitutional promises related to the organization of the state,
division of legislative competence and authority, and—in the focus
below—protection of individual and collective constitutional rights.
Notably, this schema—treating as distinct the general legal and
specialized constitutional roles of state judicial institutions—is an
unusual perspective for most readers from North America and other
regions more closely tied to the British legal traditions. In those
countries, the highest appellate (judicial) court often performs a double
duty as the national constitutional court: the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Supreme Court of Canada are the prominent
examples of this different model. The Spanish institutional
organization is typical of European states and, indeed, far more
common globally.271
In the typical European model, the constitution assigns the special
task of constitutional interpretation, including rights adjudication, to a
specialized court or tribunal—often exclusively. The constitutional
court model highlights the special role, tasks, and authority of a tribunal
with such powers, especially the weighty power of constitutional
judicial review. This model, formulated by Hans Kelsen for the Second
Austrian Republic in 1920,272 is commonly contrasted with the
American model.273 Although commonly labeled a “court,” a
constitutional court in Kelsen’s model is not merely another judicial
institution; it is an adjudicatory body outside the judiciary.274 A
constitutional court is typically given authority to review only
constitutional issues, not disputes without a constitutional character.275
Moreover, such a court typically has exclusive authority to review
constitutional claims, requiring lower courts to refer such issues to the
specialized court.276
Spain follows the Kelsenian model closely. The Spanish
Constitutional Court is created and empowered in Part IX of the
Constitution, rather than in Part VI, which describes the role of the

271 Louis Favoreau, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 46 (Louis
Henkin & Albert J. Resenthal eds., 1990)
272 Id.
273 See Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy, 25 W.
EUR. POL. 77, 79 (2002); Garlicki, supra note 270.
274 Sweet, supra note 273, at 79–80.
275 Id.
276 Id.
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judiciary as a whole.277 The Spanish Constitutional Court has authority
to consider constitutional issues only and is the primary and supreme
state institution empowered to rule on the constitutionality of laws. As
is common of constitutional courts, members of the Spanish
Constitutional Court must be selected through special processes. In
Spain, the appointment of magistrados (justices) of the Constitutional
Court requires super majority support from Congreso and the Senado
for all nominees originating from those institutions.278 Each Spanish
justice must have special, relevant qualifications, and each serves a
nine-year term, with three members leaving the court every three
years.279
One objective of the Kelsen model is to highlight the extrajudicial
nature of constitutional court power.280 This characteristic may be why
constitutional courts are more globally popular than the American
model: they acknowledge the exceptional authority of judicial review,
highlight the elevated stature of constitutional norms, and reiterate the
distinct nature of the value-rich and purposive interpretation that a
constitution (unlike a statute or contract) requires. Such attitudes
toward constitutional courts reaffirm the legal and transformative
power of constitutional rights enforcement, a refutation of fascist
disregard for the dignity and worth of all human beings.
In fact, prominent scholars have shown that robust constitutional
judicial review has often arisen in the aftermath of authoritarian
regimes.281 In such stark transitions, the constitutional courts take on a
distinct, protective role to facilitate the transformation. On its twentyfifth anniversary, King Juan Carlos I asserted that Spaniards “owe a
great deal” to the Spanish Constitutional Court as the “guarantor of the
rules, values and principles” of the Constitution and as “an interpretive
guiding light and protecting bastion of the letter and spirit of our
Constitution.”282 This special role is also reflected in the distinct
relationship between the Constitutional Court and the Spanish Model
277
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of democratic transition. Unlike many state institutions created through
the Spanish drafting process, the Constitutional Court is less a result of
the process than a guarantor of it. The Constitutional Court protects the
negotiated terms of the transition. It is the primary institution designed
to ensure, within its capabilities, that the consensus-based promises of
the drafting era are upheld.
2. Rights Protections in the Constitutional Text
Enforceable rights protections, one of the hallmarks of modern
constitutionalism, are a response against all three elements of the
Franco regime: autocracy, authoritarianism, and fascism. Individual
liberties, including political freedoms, collective rights to language and
culture, and the promotion of social welfare for all Spaniards, are
forcefully antithetical to authoritarianism. The protection of such rights
runs counter to the fascist use of authority to suppress dissent, oppress
regional nationalism, and prioritize the desires of the state over the
needs of individual citizens. This section focuses on the substantive
content of constitutional rights in Spain because it is a direct refutation
of the prior regime.
a. Hierarchical Structure of Rights
The Spanish Constitution includes an expansive list of rights drawn
from postwar international human rights documents and extant
democratic European constitutions—a broad array of civil and
political, social and economic, and collective and cultural rights. The
rights in the Spanish Constitution, though expansive in number, are not
equal in value. Spain’s constitutional text establishes a hierarchy of
rights: “A different scale of legal protection has been established
among rights, such that some of them seem to be substantively more
important than others, depending on the group they belong to.”283 At
the top of the hierarchy sits the animating idea of human dignity—a
common characteristic of postwar constitutions. As the Constitution
says, “[H]uman dignity, the inviolable and inherent rights, the free
development of the personality, the respect for the law and for the rights
of others are the foundation of political order and social peace.”284
Beyond dignity, the Spanish Bill of Rights (Part I of the
Constitution) identifies different categories of rights. The differences
283
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are evident in the textual division of Part I into Chapter 2 (“Rights and
Liberties”) and Chapter 3 (“Governing Principles of Economic and
Social Policy”).285 The relative importance of the rights is evident in
the difference in categorization, their textual description, and their
differing enforcement options. Generally speaking, traditional civil and
political rights are enumerated in Chapter 2. They are described with
classical fundamental rights language, are labeled “rights,” and have
the broadest range of judicial protection options. Other categories of
rights—economic rights, social welfare rights, labor rights, among
others—are more likely to be relegated to Chapter 3. The Chapter’s
title identifies them as “governing principles” instead of as rights, and
they have no direct avenues of judicial enforcement or protection.286
This division and hierarchy is not a Spanish invention. A similar
hierarchy exists in the “International Bill of Rights,” the core human
rights treaties of the United Nations: the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and
Cultural Rights.287 Hence, it is unsurprising that this division is evident
in hierarchies of kind and of enforcement in the Spanish Constitution.
The text secures the hierarchy of rights in Section 53.288 Section 53
begins with the assertion that the civil and political “rights and liberties
recognized in Chapter Two . . . are binding for all public authorities
[and] may be regulated only by law which shall, in any case, respect
their essential content.”289 This “essential content” requirement

Id. at pt. I, ch. 2 and 3.
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 3.
287 Initially, a single covenant was planned to expand on the principles agreed upon in
the UDHR but the U.N. General Assembly agreed to split the draft covenant into two distinct
documents in 1952. G.A. Res. 543 (VI) (Feb. 5, 1952). Indeed, the United Nation’s original
differentiation in 1952 is the most obvious source of the ongoing division of civil/political
and socioeconomic rights in most of the world’s constitutions. These documents, the ICCPR
and the ICESCR, contained different lists of rights and subjected states to different levels of
obligations related to remedies and enforcement.
288 To understand this hierarchy, recall that the bill of rights includes Chapter 2 (“Rights
and Liberties” consisting of Equality [Article 14] and two distinct Divisions. Division 1 is
“Fundamental Rights and Public Liberties” (including many traditional civil and political
rights, certain labor rights, and the right to education) and Division 2 is “Rights and Duties
of Citizens” (including certain duties of citizens and additional economic rights and the
rights of marriage and private property). CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution]
Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I.
289 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 4, art. 53,
§ 1. The Chapter 2 fundamental rights are judicially enforceable rules, with direct and
immediate legal effect. This point is made multiple times in the Constitution.
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prohibits Parliament’s use of law-making authority to strip away the
inherent, intended protection provided by the textual right.
The second part of Article 53 identifies the first two judicial
remedies related to rights protection:
Any citizen may assert his or her claim to protect the liberties and
rights recognised in Article 14 [Equality] and in Section 1 of Chapter
Two, by means of a preferential and summary procedure in the
ordinary courts and, when appropriate, by submitting an individual
appeal for protection (recurso de amparo) to the Constitutional
Court.290

These two special judicial procedures, the “preferential and summary
procedure” in ordinary courts and the amparo appeal to the
Constitutional Court, are available only for the core civil and political
rights.291 So, Chapter 2 rights bind all government entities, and
legislation that limits those rights is substantively constrained by the
essential content requirement. But only traditional civil and political
rights are identified for special judicial and constitutional protection.
Depending on one’s definition of a Bill of Rights, Chapter 3 of the
Constitution may also be included. Chapter 3, “Governing Principles
of Social and Economic Policy,” includes an array of social welfare
rights, some additional economic rights, cultural rights, and
environmental rights, among others.292 However, the limitations on and
guidance to state institutions in their tasks related to Chapter 3 rights
are less stringent: “substantive legislation, judicial practice and actions
of the public authorities shall be based on the recognition, respect and
protection of the principles recognised in Chapter Three.”293
Additionally, judicial protection is far less robust: Chapter 3 rights
“may only be invoked in the ordinary courts in the context of the legal

290
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In Chapter 3, some of the individual provisions refer to the “governing principles”
with the language of “rights” (“right to health protection,” “right to decent and affordable
housing,” and “right to an environment suitable for personal development”)
and others
are merely instructions to public authorities, in significantly varied language: “public
authorities shall promote” or that the “State shall be especially concerned with. . .”, or it
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substantive government limitations on Chapter 2 rights, are less protective of Chapter 3
rights. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 3.
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provisions by which they are developed.”294 There are no claims absent
statutory grant of rights or remedies.
Finally, the hierarchical nature of such rights is additionally evident
in the procedural requirements for related legislation. For “fundamental
rights and public liberties,”295 related legislation must be passed
through an “organic act” (ley orgánica). Procedural requirements for
organic acts are more rigorous: any initial passage or subsequent
amendment or full repeal must demonstrate an absolute majority of the
Congreso on a final vote on the entirety of the bill.296 The purpose of
heightened requirements is to ensure greater support and more
complete consideration. The hope is that greater consensus will be
evidenced in the passage of such laws.297 No such requirement exists
for other rights.
Although the Spanish mechanism of implementing organic act
legislation for the core of its protected rights is uncommon, the values
behind it are often present in the thoughts of constitutional drafters.
This allows Spain to ensure that the spirit of compromise and the high
valuation of rights (the Spanish consenso) are present when future
amendments or far-reaching rights-related legislation is passed. In
Spain, the heightened requirements of organic laws are an attempt to
ensure this additional level of protection. This may be a particular or
heightened concern for negotiated constitutional transitions. In Spain,
it reflects an extension of the Spanish Model into the regular governing
era (far beyond the constituting drafting moment). It encourages, and
potentially forces, cooperation and moderation among political parties
in certain contentious or important legislative areas of constitutional
Id.
Id. at pt. III, ch. 8, art. 81.
296 Id.
297 The Constitutional Court has narrowly interpreted the organic law protection from
Article 81. First, the court has held that the list of rights that are subject to the organic law
requirement is restricted; it is only Articles 15 to 29, i.e., Chapter 2, Article 1 of the
Constitution. AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 30. This excludes a host of rights,
most notable the right to equality in Article 14, but also the rights in Section 2 of Chapter 2
(such as the right to private property in Article 33) that would seem likely to be highly
protected as well. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I,
ch. 2. Additionally, the Constitutional Court has a restrictive view of when the organic law
requirement applies to rights-related legislation—even when it relates to the short list of
protected rights. The court will require organic law procedures only when the legislation
applies directly to the Article 1 right. Laws that have an indirect effect on the protected rights
do not trigger the special procedures. The Congress of Deputies has not struggled to achieve
the requisite majorities to pass, amend, or revoke rights-related organic laws. A simple
legislative majority is sufficient for all rights other than those in Chapter 2, Article 1 and for
the non-essential elements of all rights. AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 30–31.
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significance. Furthermore, it supports the drafters’ purposes by
reassuring stakeholders that rights are entrenched: it secures the values
and protections of the constitutional founding for future generations.
b. Other Constitutional Provisions for the Protection of Rights
Additional rights-related elements of the 1978 Constitution are
responses to the fascist past and facilitate transformation toward, and
maintenance of, the nation’s transformed values. Although this is not
the place for a close reading of every Spanish constitutional provision
that advances “liberty, justice, equality and political pluralism,”298 this
Section examines three noteworthy elements that combat fascism by
advancing transformed values and protecting substantive rights: (1) a
transformative substantive right (equality), (2) a protective interpretive
principle (the essential content requirement), and (3) a supplemental
state institution for the protection of rights (the Ombud).
(i) Equality
Like dignity, equality is a core constitutional value in a constitution
responding to a fascist past. Where fascism prioritizes particular
members of the state polity—based on ethnicity, race, language,
culture, or nationality—equality provisions reject state preferences and
prejudices. Even the most cursory reading of the Spanish Constitution
demonstrates the importance of equality. The very first Section of the
Constitution tells the reader that “Spain . . . advocates as the highest
values of its legal order, liberty, justice, equality, and political
pluralism.”299 The importance of equality is reflected in the expansive
language of the formal equality clause and its placement as the first
substantive right in Article 14 of the Spanish bill of rights. It states,
“Spaniards are equal before the law and may not in any way be
discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion,
or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.”300
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§ 1.
Id.
Id. at pt. I, ch. 2, art. 14. There are several notable characteristics of the text that are
reflected in the court’s jurisprudence. First, it includes both a list of impermissible grounds
of discrimination and a more general prohibition on discrimination for unlisted conditions
or circumstances, combining the two different methods most countries choose. This is an
effective way to maximize equality protection.
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However, the Constitution has more to say about equality. Where
fascism uses the power of the state to advance certain groups, Article 9
requires affirmative government duties to advance substantive equality.
It is incumbent upon the public authorities to promote conditions
which ensure that freedom and equality of individuals and of the
groups to which they belong may be real and effective, to remove the
obstacles which prevent or hinder their full enjoyment, and to
facilitate the participation of all citizens in political, economic,
cultural, and social life.301

These obligations, to “promote conditions,” “remove obstacles,” and
“facilitate . . . participation,” require the government to actively advance
equality in Spain. The affirmative duties in Article 9 and the prohibition
on discrimination in Article 14 combine to place a significant obligation
on Spanish state entities to promote equality.
Of course, equality rights are unique among civil and political rights.
They are not single circumstance rights but rather require equal
treatment and equal regard in all government actions. Equality secures
a personal right, but it also changes the character of all state action. It
generally forbids state preferences, prejudices, or disfavor. This
potential and intent to change the nature of state treatment of
individuals highlights the antifascist values of the Constitution of 1978.
(ii) Essential Content Principle
Referring to all Chapter 2 rights, Article 53 declares that the
“exercise of such rights and liberties . . . . may be regulated only by law
which shall, in any case, respect their essential content.” Certain
inherent, vital elements of each right are meant to be protected, and the
fact that significant authority is given to the legislature to manage the
protection of rights does not mean that there are no substantive limits
on their actions in this area. This protective principle ensures powerful
protection of the core meaning of the constitutional rights, even when
details of the rights realization are delegated to the legislature. The
essential content principle protects the substance of each right as
secured in the transition while allowing the legislature to ensure the
protection retains vitality and remains effective in contemporary
society.
The essential content requirement is a substantive requirement, and
therefore, it has been subject to interpretation by the Constitutional
Court. Although the content must be examined “right by right and case
301

Id. at prelim. pt., art. 9, § 2.
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by case,”302 the court has identified general descriptions of these two
complementary elements of the essential content requirement: “To
identify what is the essential content the right will have to be linked to
human dignity, [to] the recognisability [i.e., the core understanding of
the right], and the legally protected interests. . . .Each right has its own
[essential content].”303
The “human dignity” element, a hallmark of postwar
constitutionalism, is discussed above because it is the first of the core
principles listed in the Constitution.304 There seems to be a special
relationship between dignity and transformative constitutionalism.
Additionally,
understanding
“recognisability”
requires
acknowledgement of the abstract meaning of the right: the meaning
prior to its appearance in the challenged legislation. Because there is a
meaning that “conceptually pre-dates the legislative moment,” courts
can use that meaning to ensure the related legislation respects the right
in such a way that preserves the constitutional intent for the right.305
The third element, the maintenance of the “legally protected
interests,” focuses on the desired action or liberty or decision that is
legally protected for the individual right-holder. For example, the
legally protected interest in the right of free expression is the lawfully
protected capacity to express one’s own formulated thoughts or
opinions. For the court, this identifies a substantive core of protection
that “gives rise to the right” and makes it “real, concrete and effectively
protected.”306
These three elements will be examined by the court in a case alleging
the denial of the essential content of a right. This is another area where
the influence of a similarly anti-authoritarian and transformative
constitution is evident.307 Article 19 of the German Basic Law says that
“[i]nsofar as, under this Basic Law, a basic right may be restricted by
or pursuant to a law. . . . In no case may the essence of a basic right be

S.T.C., Nov. 18, 1993 (B.O.E. No. 341) (Spain).
AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 23. [drawn from CCT 11/1981].
304 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution], Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, art. 10. This
is a common place for this right and this value; many postwar, transformative constitutions
put dignity in a primary place in their new constitutions. Germany is the most well-known
example, GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution], May 23, 1949, pt. I, art. 1 (Germany); but also
South Africa, Constitution, Feb. 4, 1997, ch. 1, § 1.a (South Africa).
305 S.T.C., Apr. 8, 1993 (B.O.E. No. 11) (Spain).
306 Id.
307 AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 31.
302
303
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affected.”308 In Spain, the Constitutional Court’s protection of essential
content exemplifies the ongoing role of the court to protect the core
negotiated agreement and facilitate the transformation that the
Constitution represents.
(iii) The Role of the Ombud
The absence of reliable substantive rights protections in a fascist
state reflects the priorities of the regime. Radically different values are
evident in the role of the Ombud in the Constitution of 1978. Section
54, the second of only two provisions in Chapter 4 of the Spanish bill
of rights (titled “Guarantee of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms”),
creates the position of Ombud (Defensor del Pueblo).309 The Ombud,
“who shall be a high commissioner of the Cortes Generales, appointed
by them to defend the rights contained in” the Spanish bill of rights,
plays a significant role in the protection of rights and the promotion of
rights-based constitutional values.310
Elected by a super majority of the Congreso and Senado, the Ombud
is a public advocate “responsible for defending the fundamental rights
and civil liberties of the citizens by monitoring the activity” of national,
regional and local authorities.311 The duties of the Ombud are
predominately defined by organic law, but the Ombud functions
independently on its own initiative or upon request from the public.312
The work of the Ombud is focused on the acts of the public
administration; the Ombud does not initiate or participate in claims
between private individuals. Cooperation with the Ombud is required
by law for public entities.313
The Ombud’s capacity to bring constitutional claims against
governmental entities is discussed below, but its pointed refutation of
fascist or authoritarian government’s denial of rights is significant. The
Constitution of 1978 creates the Ombud as a supplemental rights
institution to advance rights protections for individuals. Moreover, the
GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution], May 23, 1949, pt. I, art. 19, § 1 and 2 (Germany).
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 4 art. 54.
“Defensor del Pueblo” translates as “Defender of the People” but is more commonly
translated as its functional equivalent, Ombudsperson. I have used the gender-neutral
version Ombud.
310 See id.
311 What is the Defensor del Pueblo?, DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO, https://www.defensor
delpueblo.es/en/who-we-are/what-is-the-defensor/.
312 LEY ORGÁNICA 31/1981, DE 8 DE ABRIL, DEL DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO [Organic Law
of the Ombud], http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1981/05/07/pdfs/A09764-09768.pdf (Spain).
313 NEWTON, supra note 80, at 28–29.
308
309
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authorization and support of a governmental institution to ensure the
government complies with its own rules is a starkly transformative
constitutional element. The Ombud is an actor within the government
that is empowered to use the independent powers to ensure
governmental compliance with the rule of law and the Constitution: this
is the antithesis of authoritarian government.
3. Rights Claims at the Constitutional Court
The authority of the Spanish Constitutional Court is national,
relatively expansive, and final. It was also the exclusive tribunal with
direct authority over parliamentary laws, although other state actions
can be reviewed by the regular courts in certain circumstances.314 As a
consequence, the Constitutional Court has the principal power to
enforce the Constitution through judicial review. The court can, subject
to jurisdictional requirements,315 invalidate parliamentary acts, regional
statutes, and regulations with the force of law issued by the national or
Autonomous Communities’ legislatures.316 While the Spanish Supreme
Court (Tribunal Supremo de España) has ultimate nationwide appellate
authority over all non-constitutional issues, the Constitutional Court is
supreme for interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution.317
Although the Spanish Constitutional Court is a court of limited and
special jurisdiction, the constitutional text and norms are binding and
applicable upon the entirety of the judiciary and all governmental
entities.318 The court’s authority to police the promises of the
Constitution counters the fascist elements of Spain’s past by dispersing
governmental power and reaffirming the supremacy of the rule of law,
especially constitutional rules.

314 Organic Law 6/2007 amended the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court to allow
the Constitutional Court increased discretion to choose whether to hear amparo appeals. The
same organic law also expanded the constitutional review authority of regular courts in
relation to amparo claims. LEY ORGÁNICA 6/2007, DE 24 DE MAYO, POR LA QUE SE
MODIFICA LA LEY ORGÁNICA 2/1979, DE 3 DE OCTUBRE, DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL
[Organic Law amending the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court], http://www.boe.es/
boe/dias/2007/05/25/pdfs/A22541-22547.pdf (Spain).
315 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution], Dec. 27, 1978, pt. IX, art. 161–
63.
316 Id. at art. 161.
317 “The Supreme Court, with jurisdiction over the whole of Spain, is the highest judicial
body in all branches of justice, except with regard to provisions concerning constitutional
guarantees.” Id. at pt. V, art. 123, § 1.
318 Id. at pt. I, ch. 4, art. 53, § 1.
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In general, there are two categories of constitutional claims that can
be brought before the Constitutional Court: claims initiated by state
institutions and claims from individuals or nongovernmental legal
entities.
a. State Institutional Claims
The most common route for institutional claims to be brought before
the Constitutional Court is through references from the regular
judiciary regarding unavoidable constitutional issues in lower court
proceedings. “If a judicial body considers, when hearing a case, that. .
. an act which is applicable thereto and upon the validity of which the
judgment depends, might be contrary to the Constitution, it may bring
the matter before the Constitutional Court.”319 In general, this process
of reference ensures a unified interpretation of the Constitution from a
single body designed to interpret the qualitatively different terms of the
Constitution.
Additionally, the Constitution allows the Constitutional Court
access to claims from minority parties in the national legislature or
Autonomous Communities. The former types of claims, which are
commonly allowed by European constitutions,320 permit a minority of
either legislative house to sponsor a claim of unconstitutionality.321
These members usually belong to parties that opposed the challenged
law in the legislature. In Spain, a group of fifty members of the
Congreso or the Senado are sufficient to bring a challenge.
Autonomous Community claims allow an Autonomous Community
to protect its constitutional interests when the Community’s executive
body disputes the validity of an action by the national government.
Conversely, the national government “may appeal to the Constitutional
Court against provisions and resolutions adopted by the bodies of the
Self-governing Communities, which shall bring about the [temporary]
suspension of the contested provisions or resolutions.”322
Finally, the national Ombud (Defensor del Pueblo) can bring claims
to the Constitutional Court. The Ombud role was created by Article 54

Id. at pt. IX, art. 163.
Wojceich Sadurski, Constitutional Review in Europe and in the United States:
Influences, Paradoxes, and Convergence, in THE AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM REVISITED
(Marcello Fantoni & Leonardo Morlino, eds., 2016).
321 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution], Dec. 27, 1978, pt. IX, art. 162, §
1.
322 Id. at pt. IX, art. 161, § 2.
319
320
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of the Constitution (with many details settled by a 1981 organic law323)
for the specific purpose of protecting the individual rights set forth in
the Spanish bill of rights.324Although the role of the Ombud is primarily
investigative, the remedies that are available to the Ombud include:
referral to the Public Prosecutor, independent initiation of claims of
unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court, commencing of
fundamental rights-based amparo actions on behalf of individuals,
recommendations to public authorities, and reports to Parliament on
rights-related matters.325
Spain’s reaction to fascism and consequential promotion of its new
constitutional values directly contributed to the significant number of
state actors who can bring a constitutional challenge. This has at least
three benefits consistent with the reaction against fascism and
promotion of the new constitutional values. First, the plethora of
permitted parties allows ample opportunities for the court to review
potentially unconstitutional state action. This affirms the Constitution’s
values by allowing the court to assess, and, where appropriate, to affirm
the superior legal value of rights and other constitutional rules.
Additionally, internal avenues of seeking redress for unconstitutional
government actions promote the rule of law. Finally, the availability of
legal remedies discourages extralegal means of seeking redress. It
provides a de-escalating and lawful (and hopefully trusted) means of
addressing political conflict. In a transition that valued moderation and
peaceful, negotiated resolution of potential conflicts—and for a nation
that experienced a shattering civil war—such a process has enormous
value.
b. Individual Claims to the Court
The second category of rights-based claims to the Constitutional
Court are individual claims: claims brought by real persons or legal
entities for a vindication of their rights. The most common individual
claim, and the source of the significant majority of all claims before the
Constitutional Court, is the recurso de amparo constitucional
(hereinafter referred to as the “amparo”). The amparo is the first of two
323 LEY ORGÁNICA 31/1981, DE 8 DE ABRIL, DEL DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO [Organic Law
of the Ombud], http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1981/05/07/pdfs/A09764-09768.pdf (Spain).
324 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution], Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 4, art. 54.
325 NEWTON, supra note 80, at 28–29; AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 36–38;
LEY ORGÁNICA 31/1981, DE 8 DE ABRIL, DEL DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO [Organic Law of the
Ombud], http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1981/05/07/pdfs/A09764-09768.pdf (Spain).
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specialized domestic options for the vindication of a fundamental right
under the Constitution. An amparo claim may only assert denial of a
fundamental right; i.e., a right enumerated in Chapter 2, Section 1, or
in Article 14 of the Constitution.326
The Organic Law for the Constitutional Court lays out the amparo
procedure.327 The law makes such claims available “against violations
of the rights and freedoms. . . resulting from provisions, legal
enactments, omissions or flagrantly illegal actions by the public
authorities of the State, the Autonomous Communities and other
territorial, corporate or institutional public bodies, as well as by
officials or agents.”328 Challenges to traditional parliamentary laws are
not directly subject to challenge through amparo.329 However, the
amparo procedure and the work of the Constitutional Court has
changed significantly since 2007. To deal with the high number of
backlogged amparo claims, Parliament granted the court additional
discretion over the claims submitted to the court.330 The bulk of these
claims are now heard only by the regular judiciary; “it was time to trust
Spanish ordinary judges and tribunals as the main fundamental rights
guarantors.”331 As a result of the 2007 changes, individuals who wish
to have their amparo claim heard by judges of the Constitutional Court

326 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution], Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 4, art. 53,
§ 2 (“Any citizen may assert his or her claim to the protection of the liberties and rights
recognized in Article 14 and in Section 1, of Chapter Two . . . by submitting an individual
appeal for protection to the Constitutional Court. This latter procedure shall be applicable to
conscientious objection as recognized in Section 30”).
327 LEY ORGÁNICA 2/1979, DE 3 DE OCTUBRE, DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL
[Organic Law of the Constitutional Court], http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1979/10/05/pdfs/
A23186-23195.pdf (Spain).
328 Id. at art. 41.
329 Even though a direct constitutional challenge of legislation cannot be the basis for
the amparo, such a procedure can indirectly result in a declaration of unconstitutionality of
the law if the challenged judicial ruling (that is found to be a violation of the claimant’s
rights) is based on correct application of an apparently unconstitutional law. Then the
chamber or section of the Constitutional Court that is hearing the appeal can permissibly
refer it to the plenary Court for review of constitutionality. This is allowed because it is a
referral of the question of unconstitutionality from a judge, which is permitted by the
Constitution and CCOA, rather than a direct challenge to the law through an amparo.
AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 47–8.
330 LEY ORGÁNICA 6/2007, DE 24 DE MAYO, POR LA QUE SE MODIFICA LA LEY
ORGÁNICA 2/1979, DE 3 DE OCTUBRE, DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL [Organic Law
amending the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court], http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2007/
05/25/pdfs/A22541-22547.pdf (Spain).
331 AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 46.
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must now demonstrate that their particular controversy has a “special
constitutional significance” (especial transcencia constitutional).332
Consequently, the Constitutional Court is no longer the exclusive
arbiter of amparo claims. Instead, the court plays a capstone or
backstop role and, as described above, adjudicates cases of “special
constitutional significance” at its own discretion. Rather than directly
adjudicating constitutional issues, the court’s altered function is to
indirectly ensure proper interpretation and application of constitutional
rules through supervision of the lower courts.
Even before the 2007 reforms, other (non-amparo) rights claims
could be adjudicated through a “preferential and summary procedure”
in an ordinary court.333
The primary idea is that ordinary courts, which are plentiful and
accessible (especially when compared with the Constitutional Court)
should be the ones to guarantee fundamental rights in the very first
place . . . an individual . . . should be able to go to the nearby court
through a preferential and summary process to get immediate
protection.334

These claims are “preferential and summary” due to their simplified
processes, shorter deadlines, and the limitation on subject matter to only
fundamental rights.335
The decision regarding whether the summary procedure in any
particular case is appropriate is made by the judge.336 Hence, since
2007, the vast majority of constitutional claims are brought and decided
in the ordinary courts. Only institutional claims or individual claims of
“special constitutional significance” will be decided by the
Constitutional Court. In order to protect those fundamental Spanish
332 LEY ORGÁNICA 6/2007, DE 24 DE MAYO, POR LA QUE SE MODIFICA LA LEY
ORGÁNICA 2/1979, DE 3 DE OCTUBRE, DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL [Organic Law
amending the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court], http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2007
/05/25/pdfs/A22541-22547.pdf (Spain).
333 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 4, art. 53,
§ 2.
334 AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 40.
335 There is no uniformity of process for these procedures. Various special subject matter
laws outline different processes; claims brought in labor law area will differ for claims
brought under military jurisdiction, as an example. Additionally, there are even more
specialized processes for claims that are inherently time sensitive; habeas corpus claims,
election rights claims, etc. Id. at 42.
336 Id. at 43. Parliamentary laws cannot themselves be directly challenged through the
summary process. Rather, claims are brought against a public authority implementing the
suspect law (even if the public authority is a lower court upholding or applying that law to
the challenging party).
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rights, courts have shortened the timeframe for such challenges,
thereby increasing the likelihood of an powerful resolution.
Overall, the process and availability of judicial and constitutional
court review now addresses a significant perceived failing of the
Spanish judicial system: the inability to deal with amparo claims in a
timely and effective manner. This development, achieved through the
absolute majority process of an organic law, serves the larger purposes
of constitutional review and affirms the rule of law. Moreover, the more
diffused responsibility for the protection of fundamental rights, shared
now with ordinary judges, furthers the Spanish interest in affirming
constitutional rights in reaction to the general failure to protect
individual rights in the years of fascism, authoritarianism, and
autocracy.
IV
TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM FORTY YEARS AFTER
FRANCO
Assessing a constitutional transition and evaluating a constitution
are perilous and potentially hubristic tasks. On the other hand, refusing
to examine the results of such a transition or to appraise alternative
methods of transition—especially for a radical transformation on the
scale of Spain’s—hinders future constitutional progress. But such
comparisons can never exhibit scientific precision; there are no control
groups in comparative constitutional history or comparative
constitutional design. Moreover, any evaluative conclusions will
always be preliminary because of the unknowable number of years of
future development for the constitution. There is no assured way to
know if the current version of an extant constitution is in its early years
or its late stage. Nevertheless, close examination and contextual
appraisal are both possible and valuable.
In addition to the inevitable subjectivity of such an analysis, there
are unavoidable challenges to analyzing constitutional problems and
solutions across geographical, cultural, linguistic, and even temporal
differences. However, not all of such an evaluation must fall to claims
of relativism. Most nations in the process of drafting a new constitution
are rejecting a specific former system of government and set of values
while pursuing an improved system with perceived better values. This
accurately describes the Spanish transition. Thus, the transformative
and reactive goals of the new Constitution provide a fair basis for
assessment.
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A. Spain’s Constitutional Answer to Authoritarianism
Perhaps the first test of a constitution’s success is how well it
responds to the perceived failings of the prior regime and mode of
governance. Does the constitution’s response to the preceding system
of government address the faults of the past in an effective and
sustainable way? For modern Spain, the question is whether the rule of
law, democracy, the organization of the state, the distribution of
national and regional authority, and the protection of individual rights
viably counter the errors of autocracy, authoritarianism, and fascism.
As shown in Part III, forty years after the death of Franco there is ample
evidence that the current Spanish Constitution addresses each of the
overarching faults of the past regime.
A second, more affirmative standard also belongs in this evaluation:
a new constitution must look forward and not merely back. Does the
new constitution encapsulate the transformative, aspirational values of
the polity it serves in an effective and enduring way? For reviewers
who support the values of modern constitutionalism—rule of law,
restrained governmental power, democratic governance, and the
protection of individual rights—these are values against which the
resulting political and legal system can be measured. It is particularly
appropriate to evaluate the Spanish transition against these four
common goals of modern constitutionalism because each is identified
and lauded in the Spanish Constitution’s Preamble.
Moreover, Spain’s pursuit of constitutional democracy occurred in
the unique context of post-War, 1970s Europe, against the backdrop of
Spain’s history of monarchy, Catholicism, failed constitutionalism,
civil war, and Francoism. As a result, the Spanish iteration of modern
constitutionalism included correlated goals: European integration,
international community acceptance, national unity, ethnocultural
regional autonomy, socioeconomic development, and the general
improvement of the quality of life for all Spaniards.337
Thus, the question becomes: Does multilevel representative
democracy, adoption of international standards of human rights
protections, a dynamic system of regional autonomy, and European
integration advance the Spanish vision of modern democratic
constitutionalism? The predominant (if incomplete) answer is yes.
337 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pmbl. (“Guarantee
democratic coexistence within the Constitution and the laws . . .; Consolidate a State of Law
which ensures the rule of law . . . ; Protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise
of human rights…; [and] Establish an advanced democratic society”).
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Much of this evaluation is based on the relative stability, peacefulness,
and socioeconomic maturity of Spain as of its fortieth anniversary.
Today, despite its imperfections, Spain is a mature, functioning
constitutional democracy. The Constitution of 1978 secured a new state
capable of protecting human rights that also existed in alignment with
European and international expectations. It secured this peace and
significant economic investment through membership in the European
Union. It modernized and de-politicized the role of its military through
civilian control and NATO alignment.338 Finally, it entrenched
expansive individual and collective rights within an independent
judicial and legal system with all the significant indicators of the rule
of law. These are undoubtedly hallmarks of a successful
transformation.339
As was shown in Part III, the expanded list of goals for Spain’s own
form of modern constitutional democracy—derived from its history
and expressed in the Preamble—was inseparable from the core,
unstated goal of a decisive break from the authoritarian past. This is the
entwined nature of the desire for constitutional democracy and the
rejection of Francoism. The successful rejection of authoritarian values
and reformulation of the Francoist state institutions were inextricably
coupled with establishment of a modern constitutional democracy in
Spain.
However, this Article has focused on more than the substantive
achievements of Spanish constitutionalism. It has also explored a
procedural axis in addition to the 1978 Constitution’s substantive
content axis. As a result, the Spanish Model of transition also needs to
be evaluated for its contribution to Spain’s transformation and potential
contribution to constitutional transition elsewhere.
B. The Evolving Significance of the Spanish Model
The term “Spanish Model” refers to a relatively peaceful transition
from authoritarianism to constitutionalism through negotiated,
consensus-based reforms without disruption of the existing legal
JAVIER CERCAS, supra note 247, at 370–71.
It is important to note that any such assessment can only address the most general
terms. Whether the Constitution meets the needs of each individual or of specific
communities of common interest—for example, of Spanish women or gay and lesbian
persons or workers—is a valuable question worthy of research, but beyond the scope of this
Article. More acutely, the current Catalonia independence crisis highlights a similarly
important question. The assertion that the Spanish Constitution is successful on its own
terms does not dismiss the question of whether it does (or should) meet the twenty-first
century nationalist aspirations of Catalonians.
338
339
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framework through violence or revolution. Maintenance of legal
continuity, prioritization of pact-led negotiation, and the dominance of
moderation in final terms are the hallmarks of the Spanish Model. For
Spain, the model provided significant value in the potentially violent,
radically uncertain transition period following the death of Franco. The
model promoted judicious results reflective of significant consensus;
rejected the punitive, winner-take-all model of prior eras; reflected the
centrist wishes of most Spaniards; kept political parties and other
interest groups engaged; and diffused potential violent reaction from
the military or extremist elements of civil society.340
1. A Viable Model for Spanish Transformation
Ultimately, the Spanish Model of constitutional transition is
important and valuable only if it facilitates a peaceful transformation
from authoritarianism to constitutional democracy. Does it facilitate a
relatively effective process of constitutional change resulting in a
rights-based democracy with enduring value for the nation and its
people? To the extent that the characteristics of the process—legal
continuity, negotiation, consensus, elite engagement, and
moderation—supported the content of the Constitution and the
expectations of Spaniards, the Spanish Model served the transition
extraordinarily well. The Constitution’s fortieth anniversary itself is
valid initial evidence of success of the Spanish Model. In the context
of Spain’s constitutional history, a forty-year period of stable
democracy is without domestic precedent. The longest prior
democratic government, under the Constitution of 1931, lasted only

340 Although this Article demonstrates the effectiveness of the model’s characteristics in
securing a transition to constitutional democracy, it is worth noting that moderation, elite
empowerment, and formal legal continuity are not self-evidently or universally praiseworthy
in a democratic transformation. Moderation in the process may strike a balance between
conflicting, coequal values and keep political opponents engaged in the transition, but it is
less of a virtue when the outgoing regime is deeply racist or misogynist or holds some other
value antithetical to constitutional democracy. It is not appropriate to only moderately
condemn genocide, apartheid, or other distasteful government programs. Similarly,
negotiations among elites may diminish violence but it might also empower the legacy
actors of a violent, oppressive regime. The maintenance of formal legal stability, while it
minimizes sociopolitical shocks, could be perceived as affirmation of a distasteful prior
government and could support future political power for constitutionally misaligned parties.
Although there is limited evidence of this in the Spanish transition, the concerns remain.
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five to eight years (depending on how one measures the years of
shrinking territory during the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939).341
The forty years (and counting) of the Spanish Constitution are even
more remarkable in the global context, where short-lived constitutions
are the norm, not the exception. A recent study identified the average
“lifespan” of a constitution as only nineteen years,342 and an even lower
average, twelve years, for constitutions drafted since the end of World
War II.343 Of course, years of duration could be an invalid mark of
success if an allegedly democratic, human rights constitution were
maintained by force or other means counter to the constitution’s rules
or values. There is no such claim, as a general matter, in modern Spain.
Even the most forceful claims of a denial of self-determination by
independence-minded regions, whatever the objective validity, are
claims from outside the existing constitutional framework. The least
we can say at this stage is that the Spanish Model provided a successful
process to transition from the still-entrenched post-Franco authoritarian
state to a modern constitutional democracy. When viewed more
generally, Spain’s transformation achieved the general goals of modern
constitutionalism and the context specific goals identified by Spaniards
in their Constitution.
Moreover, the model’s influence did not end on the day the 1978
Constitution came into force; it left a legacy within Spanish
constitutional law and practice. The entrenchment of enduring
processes that promote moderate, consensus-driven results supports the
ongoing vitality of the transformation. The use of heightened voting
requirements for the higher-stakes organic laws, the tailored autonomy
statutes defining competence for the regions, and the Parliamentary
nominations to the Constitutional Court are all examples of
constitutional provisions that encourage viable governing relationships
among people and parties with competing interests.344

341 This was the Second Spanish Republic. The First Spanish Republic lasted less than
two years from February 1873 to December 1874. Raymund Carr, Liberalism and Reaction
1831–1934, in SPAIN: A HISTORY (Raymund Carr ed., Oxford 2000).
342 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 143, at 2.
343 Thomas Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, & James Melton, The Lifespan of Written
Constitutions,
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/lifespan-written-constitutions
(a
summary of findings published in ZACHARY ELKINS, THOMAS GINSBURG, & JAMES
MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009)).
344 Of note, such entrenchment is not unique to the Spanish transition. Constitutions
often protect certain decisions, like amendments, from easy alteration by bare majorities.
(That is also true of many of the individual elements of the model; they were not individually
inventive, just collectively effective.).
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Arguably, the legacy of the Spanish Model helped with some of the
acute challenges experienced by Spain after the Constitution came into
force. One prominent example, the failed coup of February 23, 1981,
could have been much worse if the transition had taken a harder line on
the monarchy because the king exerted significant influence in
denouncing the coup and brought it to a peaceful conclusion. The coup
crisis also benefited from the moderating influence on the military
exerted by Suárez during the transitional years, something made
possible by the lack of a sharp disruption with the prior regime during
the move toward democracy. Hopefully future research will ask about
the legacy of the model on other important constitutional-level
challenges such as the early Basque separatist violence, the austerity
measures in response to the financial crisis of 2008,345 recurring
problems with government corruption, or the current Catalonia
independence crisis.
2. The Spanish Model Outside Spain
Another marker of the value of the Spanish Model is its popularity
with other nations. As discussed in Part II, Spain’s transition model was
noted and studied by countries in Eastern Europe as they began their
transitions to democracy a decade later. And other versions of pacted,
negotiated “legal revolutions” followed. Other than the more obvious,
analogous processes in postcommunist Eastern Europe, another
prominent example in comparative constitutional study is South Africa
as it transformed itself from apartheid authoritarianism to full
constitutional democracy. Like Spain, South Africa’s transition was
aided by party-led negotiations using the existing legal framework to
craft a new rights-based constitution and legitimize a radical
transformation. Of course, it is even more challenging to assess
whether these model exports were successful. On the one hand, these
countries left behind communist and apartheid authoritarianism for
genuine democratic governance. But many of these nations have
struggled to maintain their commitments to democratic
constitutionalism.346
345 See Laurence Knight, Spanish Economy: What Is to Blame for Its Problems?, BBC
NEWS (May 18, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17753891; Vanessa Drucker,
A New Sunrise for Spain?, GLOBAL FIN. (June 6, 2014), http://www.gfmag.com/magazine/
june-2014/new-sunrise-spain.
346 See ALEX BORRAINE, WHAT’S GONE WRONG? SOUTH AFRICA ON THE BRINK OF
FAILED STATEHOOD (2014); PAUL BLOKKER, NEW DEMOCRACIES IN CRISIS? A
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There is good reason to imagine that models for transition away from
authoritarian governance will be needed in the future. The Human
Rights Foundation notes that, “citizens of 94 countries suffer under
non-democratic regimes, meaning that 3.97 billion people are currently
controlled by tyrants, absolute monarchs, military juntas, or
competitive authoritarians. That includes 53 percent of the world’s
population.”347 These statistics support the claim that “the
authoritarianism business is booming.”348 It is consistent with the
values of constitutionalism to support nonviolent, democratic
transitions in such countries wherever possible.
Importantly, just the existence of models of transition away from
authoritarianism, where the ruler and the ruler’s supporters are not
ousted, killed, or punished, may encourage democratic transitions. The
end of authoritarian regimes is a dangerous time for the former
oppressor. Despite the limited concern one may feel for the entrenched
autocrat, few people are served by maintenance of an unjust system.
This is an additional way in which Spain’s past peaceful transition
advocates for future foreign adoption of its process of democratic
transformation.
For all its apparent success, there are many challenges ahead for
Spanish constitutionalism, which will inevitably affect our evaluation
of the transferability of the Spanish Model. As the recent Catalonian
independence actions have highlighted, the Spanish version of
significant decentralization and asymmetrical federalism may not be
viable. Spain is not the only country experiencing centrifugal forces of
nationalism and it is unclear what role domestic constitutions can play
in such passionate conflicts. Other global trends, such as the renewed
rise of far-right populism and the weakening of the European Union in
the face of Brexit and similar national pressures, may also give rise to
new challenges. Whatever the future holds, the study and practice of
constitutional transformation is enriched by the existence of the
Spanish Model and the extant example of its results in Spain and
elsewhere.

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, POLAND,
ROMANIA AND SLOVAKIA (Routledge 2013).
347 Garry Karparov & Thor Halvorssen, Why the Rise of Authoritarianism Is a Global
Catastrophe, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
democracy-post/wp/2017/02/13/why-the-rise-of-authoritarianism-is-a-global-catastrophe/?
noredirect=on&utm_term=.b0bcfaa1ab4b.
348 Id.
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CONCLUSION
Just over four decades ago, Spain was a quasi-fascist state with an
authoritarian government led by Generalissimo Francisco Franco. It
was a rare holdout to the wave of democracy and constitutionalism that
swept Europe and then much of the globe in the aftermath of World
War II and the founding of the United Nations. In fact, due to Spain’s
sideline role in the war and its usefulness to Western governments,
Spain was one of the few fascist regimes to survive after the defeat of
Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy.
With the death of Franco, Spain’s future was uncertain. But within
a few years, the newly reigning king and remnants of Franco’s power
structure had facilitated an unlikely democratic transformation—the
final democratic transition in Western Europe.349 This Article
examined and evaluated core elements of the past promise and present
reality of Spain’s transformation from Francoist dictatorship to modern
European democracy. It accomplished this by investigating the role of
the Constitution of 1978 and of the distinctive Spanish Model of
constitutional transformation in facilitating Spain’s transition to
democracy.
The Spanish Model refers to a relatively peaceful transition from
authoritarianism to constitutionalism through negotiated, consensusbased reforms without disruption of the existing legal framework
through violence or revolution. The model allowed Spain to minimize
internal threats to the transition, solidify popular constitutional
elements, and postpone contentious issues. The result was a broadly
democratic but uniquely Spanish Constitution in the modern European
model.
The endurance and vitality of the Constitution at forty years can be
explained differently by historians, political scientists, and economists,
but its success from the perspective of comparative constitutional law
seems to rest in its successful capacity to address the issues that had
been the source of destabilizing stress in Spain’s prior governing
documents. The 1978 Constitution provided viable solutions to Spain’s
pressing and recurring challenges: centrifugal tension between national
and regional levels of government, the power of the military, the quasi349 Notably, the modern Portuguese transition to democracy occurred on a very similar
timeline to the Spanish transition: a 1974 end to dictatorship in the Carnation Revolution;
democratic elections in 1975; constitution drafted 1975–76; and the new constitution came
into force in 1976. António Costa Pinto, Constitution-Making and the Democratization of
Portugal: An Enduring Legacy, 34 PORTUGUESE STUD. 35 (2018).
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governmental power and role of the Catholic Church, and the structure
of the economy. The model helped Spain identify and codify settled
processes for dynamic resolution of conflicts. The uniquely Spanish
challenges were addressed in a modern state that exhibits all the
hallmarks of democratic constitutionalism—rule of law, democracy,
and entrenched rights protections.
For modern Spain, the question was whether the rule of law,
democracy, the organization of the state, the distribution of authority,
and the protection of individual rights could viably counter the errors
of autocracy, authoritarianism, and fascism. Forty years after the death
of Franco, there is ample evidence that the Spanish Constitution
addresses each of those overarching faults. This Article demonstrated
that, despite recent, significant, and evolving challenges, constitutional
democracy is strong in Spain and has been significantly aided by its
constitutional text and the Spanish Model that inaugurated it. Forty
years later, there is much to study and learn from the manner in which
Spain successfully leveraged its constitutional process and textual
promises to overcome its authoritarian past and solidify Spain’s place
as a modern European democracy.

